We axiomatically develop a class of power indices for effectivity functions, both for the case where the set of alternatives is finite and where it is infinite. Such power indices make it possible to take the issues under consideration into account, in contrast to power indices defined just for simple games. As an example, we consider the US legislative system. We also show that our approach can be used to develop power indices for spatial political games
A set of new power indices is introduced extending Banzhaf power index and allowing to take into acc...
We present three axioms for a power index defined on the domain of simple (voting) games. Positivity...
Abstract We present an overview of the political applications of power indices, carried out at the U...
We axiomatically develop a class of power indices for effectivity functions, both for the case where...
This chapter reviews some results from the literature in which power indices related to the Shapley ...
Abstract In this paper we introduce a new family of power indices, especially designed for voting ga...
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems. The classical power indices applied to simple...
An issue game is a combination of a monotonic simple game and an issue profile. An issue profile is ...
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems as well as electoral systems and parliamentary...
The paper develops a theory of power for delegable proxy voting systems. We define a power index abl...
In this paper we discuss on several ways to extend power indices defined on simple games to the cont...
In this paper we propose methods to compute the Deegan-Packel, the Public Good, and the Shift power ...
Abstract This paper suggests an indicator of power in weighted majority games. An indicator of power...
Despite the many useful applications of power indices, the literature on power indices is raft with ...
A set of new power indices is introduced extending Banzhaf power index and allowing to take into acc...
We present three axioms for a power index defined on the domain of simple (voting) games. Positivity...
Abstract We present an overview of the political applications of power indices, carried out at the U...
We axiomatically develop a class of power indices for effectivity functions, both for the case where...
This chapter reviews some results from the literature in which power indices related to the Shapley ...
Abstract In this paper we introduce a new family of power indices, especially designed for voting ga...
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems. The classical power indices applied to simple...
An issue game is a combination of a monotonic simple game and an issue profile. An issue profile is ...
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems as well as electoral systems and parliamentary...
The paper develops a theory of power for delegable proxy voting systems. We define a power index abl...
In this paper we discuss on several ways to extend power indices defined on simple games to the cont...
In this paper we propose methods to compute the Deegan-Packel, the Public Good, and the Shift power ...
Abstract This paper suggests an indicator of power in weighted majority games. An indicator of power...
Despite the many useful applications of power indices, the literature on power indices is raft with ...
A set of new power indices is introduced extending Banzhaf power index and allowing to take into acc...
We present three axioms for a power index defined on the domain of simple (voting) games. Positivity...
Abstract We present an overview of the political applications of power indices, carried out at the U...
DOI
Add to ORKG