Autocontrollo, routine e libero arbitrio. Osservazioni sugli esperimenti di Benjamin Libet

Self-control, Routine, and Free Will. Remarks on Benjamin Libet’s Experiments - This paper aims to show that Libet’s experiment on the existence of free will is based on the assumption that free will is a spontaneous and premiseless urge to act, confined to a single moment. A blueprint for this assumption can be found in David Hume’s philosophy. Libet’s theoretical background will be compared with models from other traditions (for example, that of Aristotle), in which free will is characterized by conscious and self-controlled deliberation over an extended temporal dimension. I argue that applying this “deliberative” model to Libet’s results would yield an alternative interpretation that does not deny the existence of free will. This shows that Libet’s experiment neither confutes nor confirms the existence of free will, if free will is defined using another theoretical framework. It is suggested that experimental research framed by the “deliberative model” should analyze the agent’s capacity to overthrow entrenched routine behaviors