This chapter examines the similarities and differences between physical, psychological and virtual realities, and challenges some conventional, implicitly dualist assumptions about how these relate to each other. Virtual realities are not easily understood in either dualist or materialist reductive terms, as they exemplify the reflexive nature of perception. The chapter summarises some of the evidence for this “reflexive model”—and examines some of its consequences for the “hard” problem of consciousness. The chapter then goes on to consider how these realities might relate to some grounding reality or thing-itself, and considers some of the personal and social consequences of becoming increasingly immersed in virtual realities. Although t...
The five commentaries on our paper (Pan & Hamilton, 2018, Br. J. Psychol.) provide a useful summary ...
This paper proposes that the generation of successful virtual environments relies on better understa...
I defend a subjective representationalist theory of phenomenal experience. On this view, phenomenal ...
This chapter examines the similarities and differences between physical, psychological and virtual r...
This chapter explores the idea that a generation of successful virtual environments relies on a bett...
Dualist and Reductionist theories of mind disagree about whether or not consciousness can be reduced...
Dualist and Reductionist theories of mind disagree about whether or not consciousness can be reduced...
Situated within the context of interdisciplinary research, this thesis leverages concepts from the f...
There is still no precise answer what is generally considered a reality in psychology and what kind ...
Dualists believe that experiences have neither location nor extension, while reductive and ‘non-redu...
Physicalists commonly argue that conscious experiences are nothing more than states of the brain, an...
This chapter compares classical dualist and reductionist views of phenomenal consciousness with an a...
The contemporary debate around consciousness presents us (and often leads us to embrace) a specific ...
The prevailing scientific paradigm is that matter is primary and everything, including consciousness...
The present chapter discusses the implications of virtual reality for the theory and practice of emb...
The five commentaries on our paper (Pan & Hamilton, 2018, Br. J. Psychol.) provide a useful summary ...
This paper proposes that the generation of successful virtual environments relies on better understa...
I defend a subjective representationalist theory of phenomenal experience. On this view, phenomenal ...
This chapter examines the similarities and differences between physical, psychological and virtual r...
This chapter explores the idea that a generation of successful virtual environments relies on a bett...
Dualist and Reductionist theories of mind disagree about whether or not consciousness can be reduced...
Dualist and Reductionist theories of mind disagree about whether or not consciousness can be reduced...
Situated within the context of interdisciplinary research, this thesis leverages concepts from the f...
There is still no precise answer what is generally considered a reality in psychology and what kind ...
Dualists believe that experiences have neither location nor extension, while reductive and ‘non-redu...
Physicalists commonly argue that conscious experiences are nothing more than states of the brain, an...
This chapter compares classical dualist and reductionist views of phenomenal consciousness with an a...
The contemporary debate around consciousness presents us (and often leads us to embrace) a specific ...
The prevailing scientific paradigm is that matter is primary and everything, including consciousness...
The present chapter discusses the implications of virtual reality for the theory and practice of emb...
The five commentaries on our paper (Pan & Hamilton, 2018, Br. J. Psychol.) provide a useful summary ...
This paper proposes that the generation of successful virtual environments relies on better understa...
I defend a subjective representationalist theory of phenomenal experience. On this view, phenomenal ...