Climate change is a global pollution problem and therefore regulation of this public bad requires international institutions. Since we do not have a government at the level of the world as a whole, we have to rely on voluntary cooperation between states. The literature on international environmental agreements is usually very pessimistic on the possibility to sustain large coalitions and the Kyoto Protocol proves this in practice. In this paper a number of options are developed that improve the situation. If the R&D costs of investments in green capital can be shared among the sig-natories, the size of the stable coalition can get larger. Further-more, if asymmetries are considered and the coalition consists of countries or regions with dif...
This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to inte...
International environmental cooperation is gaining more and more importance in a world with global c...
This paper analyses the incentives to participate in an international climate agreement and the stab...
The negotiation and ratification of the Kyoto Protocol has spawned a body of literature aimed at ana...
The negotiation and ratification of the Kyoto Protocol has spawned a body of literature aimed at ana...
This paper provides a general framework for studying the profitability and stability of internationa...
This paper analyses profitability and stability of international agreements to protect the environme...
This paper studies the coalition formation and the stability of the International Environmental Agre...
We investigate whether global cooperation for emission abatement can be improved if asymmetric count...
We investigate whether global cooperation for emission abatement can be improved if asymmetric count...
This paper studies the coalition formation and the stability of the International Environmental Agre...
This paper analyses profitability and stability of international agreements to protect the environme...
This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to inte...
Climate change described by climatologists and environmental economists as a trans-boundary problem ...
This paper analyses profitability and stability of international agreements to protect the environme...
This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to inte...
International environmental cooperation is gaining more and more importance in a world with global c...
This paper analyses the incentives to participate in an international climate agreement and the stab...
The negotiation and ratification of the Kyoto Protocol has spawned a body of literature aimed at ana...
The negotiation and ratification of the Kyoto Protocol has spawned a body of literature aimed at ana...
This paper provides a general framework for studying the profitability and stability of internationa...
This paper analyses profitability and stability of international agreements to protect the environme...
This paper studies the coalition formation and the stability of the International Environmental Agre...
We investigate whether global cooperation for emission abatement can be improved if asymmetric count...
We investigate whether global cooperation for emission abatement can be improved if asymmetric count...
This paper studies the coalition formation and the stability of the International Environmental Agre...
This paper analyses profitability and stability of international agreements to protect the environme...
This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to inte...
Climate change described by climatologists and environmental economists as a trans-boundary problem ...
This paper analyses profitability and stability of international agreements to protect the environme...
This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to inte...
International environmental cooperation is gaining more and more importance in a world with global c...
This paper analyses the incentives to participate in an international climate agreement and the stab...