Add to ORKGThis paper deals with partial cooperation among countries involved in the exploitation of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.We analyse the feasibility of coalition structures and their impacts on fishing e.orts by means of games in partition function form.Furthermore, we demonstrate that the modified Shapley value is an appropriate device for the division of the gains from cooperation
To ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks, the 1995 United ...
tistage game-theoretical model which sheds some light on the economic implications inherent in the f...
According to international law, straddling fish stocks should be managed co-operatively through Regi...
This paper deals with partial cooperation among countries involved in the exploitation of straddling...
The management of internationally shared fish stocks is a major economic, environmental and politica...
Abstract. This paper sets a coalition approach to the management of high seas fisheries through a ga...
This paper examines how a Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO) might successfully achie...
This paper analyses the management of the Atlantic salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea through a coaliti...
This paper analyses the management of the Atlantic salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea through a coaliti...
This article studies how accounting for the benefits of recreational fisheries affects the formation...
In this paper a game theoretic setting is applied to the management of North Atlantic Bluefin tuna f...
A basic issue in transboundary fishery management is the new member problem. In this paper we addres...
According to international law, straddling fish stocks should be managed cooperatively through Regio...
This paper investigates conditions under which fisheries agreements between states are self-enforcin...
This paper applies game theory to address the problem of allocating profits among fishing nations, o...
To ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks, the 1995 United ...
tistage game-theoretical model which sheds some light on the economic implications inherent in the f...
According to international law, straddling fish stocks should be managed co-operatively through Regi...
This paper deals with partial cooperation among countries involved in the exploitation of straddling...
The management of internationally shared fish stocks is a major economic, environmental and politica...
Abstract. This paper sets a coalition approach to the management of high seas fisheries through a ga...
This paper examines how a Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO) might successfully achie...
This paper analyses the management of the Atlantic salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea through a coaliti...
This paper analyses the management of the Atlantic salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea through a coaliti...
This article studies how accounting for the benefits of recreational fisheries affects the formation...
In this paper a game theoretic setting is applied to the management of North Atlantic Bluefin tuna f...
A basic issue in transboundary fishery management is the new member problem. In this paper we addres...
According to international law, straddling fish stocks should be managed cooperatively through Regio...
This paper investigates conditions under which fisheries agreements between states are self-enforcin...
This paper applies game theory to address the problem of allocating profits among fishing nations, o...
To ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks, the 1995 United ...
tistage game-theoretical model which sheds some light on the economic implications inherent in the f...
According to international law, straddling fish stocks should be managed co-operatively through Regi...