Add to ORKGThis paper studies noncooperative bargaining with random proposers in proper single games. A power index is called consistent if it can be obtained as an equilibrium of the game with random proposers using the index itself as probability vector. Unlike the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices, the nucleolus has this property. The proof uses the balancedness result in Kohlberg (1971) reinterpreting the balancing wieghts as mixed strategies
In the paper we introduce weighted and restricted versions of the Deegan-Packel power index. We show...
This paper studies the nucleolus of graph-restricted games as an alternative for the Shapley value t...
This paper studies the nucleolus of graph-restricted games as an alternative for the Shapley value t...
Abstract This paper argues that the nucleolus can compete with the Shapley value as a measure of P-p...
First, we introduce pairwise-bargained consistency with a reference point, and use as reference poin...
First, we introduce pairwise-bargained consistency with a reference point, and use as reference poin...
AbstractFirst, we introduce pairwise-bargained consistency with a reference point, and use as refere...
In this study, we introduce and examine the Egalitarian property for some power indices on the class...
This paper extends the definition of the nucleolus to stochastic cooperative games, that is, to coop...
In this paper we explore the noncooperative foundations of the bargaining power that a voting rule g...
We generalize the notion of power index for simple games to different orders of criticality, where t...
One of David Schmeidler’s many important contributions in his distinguished career was the introduct...
Power indices in simple games measure the relevance of a player through her ability in being critica...
Power indices are commonly required to assign at least as much power to a player endowed with some g...
Abstract Power indices are commonly required to assign at least as much power to a player endowed wi...
In the paper we introduce weighted and restricted versions of the Deegan-Packel power index. We show...
This paper studies the nucleolus of graph-restricted games as an alternative for the Shapley value t...
This paper studies the nucleolus of graph-restricted games as an alternative for the Shapley value t...
Abstract This paper argues that the nucleolus can compete with the Shapley value as a measure of P-p...
First, we introduce pairwise-bargained consistency with a reference point, and use as reference poin...
First, we introduce pairwise-bargained consistency with a reference point, and use as reference poin...
AbstractFirst, we introduce pairwise-bargained consistency with a reference point, and use as refere...
In this study, we introduce and examine the Egalitarian property for some power indices on the class...
This paper extends the definition of the nucleolus to stochastic cooperative games, that is, to coop...
In this paper we explore the noncooperative foundations of the bargaining power that a voting rule g...
We generalize the notion of power index for simple games to different orders of criticality, where t...
One of David Schmeidler’s many important contributions in his distinguished career was the introduct...
Power indices in simple games measure the relevance of a player through her ability in being critica...
Power indices are commonly required to assign at least as much power to a player endowed with some g...
Abstract Power indices are commonly required to assign at least as much power to a player endowed wi...
In the paper we introduce weighted and restricted versions of the Deegan-Packel power index. We show...
This paper studies the nucleolus of graph-restricted games as an alternative for the Shapley value t...
This paper studies the nucleolus of graph-restricted games as an alternative for the Shapley value t...