Add to ORKGPreferences of a set of n individuals over a set of alternatives can be represented by a preference profile being an n-tuple of preference relations over these alternatives.A social choice correspondence assigns to every preference profile a subset of alternatives that can be viewed as the `most prefered' alternatives by the society consisting of all individuals.Two new social choice correspondences are introduced and analyzed.Both are Pareto optimal and are refinements of the well known Top cycle correspondence in case the corresponding simple majority win digraph is a tournament.One of them even is such a refinement for arbitrary preference profiles
Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked, single-crossing...
A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if, at any prefere...
This thesis consists of two separate papers in strategy-proof social choice theory. The first paper,...
We introduce two new majoritarian social choice correspondences. We initially assign to every altern...
We introduce two new majoritarian social choice correspondences. We initially assign to every altern...
We characterize the positional social preference correspondences (spc) satisfying the qualified majo...
A social choice correspondence is Nash self-implementable if it can beimplemented in Nash equilibriu...
Can an axiomatic justification be given for the requirement that society picks all and only Pareto o...
This paper explores an approach to social choice which is an alternative to Arrow's social welfare f...
A voting situation, in which voters are asked to rank all candidates pair by pair, induces a tournam...
Consider a social choice correspondence as a mapping from preference profiles to lotteries over some...
We take a decision theoretic approach to the classic social choice problem, using data on the freque...
A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if, at any prefere...
This paper analyzes the compromise social choice correspondence derived from the F-value of digraph ...
We consider choice correspondences that assign a subset to every choice set of alternatives, where t...
Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked, single-crossing...
A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if, at any prefere...
This thesis consists of two separate papers in strategy-proof social choice theory. The first paper,...
We introduce two new majoritarian social choice correspondences. We initially assign to every altern...
We introduce two new majoritarian social choice correspondences. We initially assign to every altern...
We characterize the positional social preference correspondences (spc) satisfying the qualified majo...
A social choice correspondence is Nash self-implementable if it can beimplemented in Nash equilibriu...
Can an axiomatic justification be given for the requirement that society picks all and only Pareto o...
This paper explores an approach to social choice which is an alternative to Arrow's social welfare f...
A voting situation, in which voters are asked to rank all candidates pair by pair, induces a tournam...
Consider a social choice correspondence as a mapping from preference profiles to lotteries over some...
We take a decision theoretic approach to the classic social choice problem, using data on the freque...
A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if, at any prefere...
This paper analyzes the compromise social choice correspondence derived from the F-value of digraph ...
We consider choice correspondences that assign a subset to every choice set of alternatives, where t...
Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked, single-crossing...
A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if, at any prefere...
This thesis consists of two separate papers in strategy-proof social choice theory. The first paper,...