This note presents a simple example of a model in which the unique rational expectations (RE)steady state equilibrium is eductively stable in the sense of Guesnerie (2002), but where evolutionary learning, as introduced in Brock and Hommes (1997), does not necessarily converge to the RE steady state price. The example is a Muthian cobweb model where producers have heterogeneous expectations and select forecasting strategies based upon recent realized profits. By means of a simple three types example we show that a locally stable RE fundamental steady state may co-exists with a locally stable two-cycle. We also study the Muthian model with a large number of different producer types, and investigate conditions under which an evolutionary adap...
In this paper we propose an explanation of the findings of a recent laboratory market forecasting ex...
We investigate the dynamics of a cobweb model with heterogeneous beliefs, generalizing the example o...
An economy exhibits structural heterogeneity when the forecasts of different agents have different e...
This note presents a simple example of a model in which the unique rational expectations (RE) steady...
This note presents a simple example of a model in which the unique rational expectations (RE) steady...
Evolutionary game theory provides a fresh perspective on the prospects that agents with hetero-geneo...
In this paper we deal with an Overlapping Generations Model with production under three diverse assu...
We investigate the dynamics of a cobweb model with heterogeneous beliefs, generalising the example o...
International audienceWithin the standard real business cycle model, we examine issues of expectatio...
Within the standard RBC model we examine issues of expectational coordination on the unique rational...
We investigate the stability properties of Muth's model of price movements when agents choose a prod...
Evolutionary game theory provides a fresh perspective on the prospects that agents with heterogeneou...
This paper studies a game theoretic model where agents choose between two updating rules to predict ...
We investigate the dynamics of a cobweb model with heterogeneous beliefs, generalizing the example o...
This paper analyzes the relationship between the expectational stability of rational expectations so...
In this paper we propose an explanation of the findings of a recent laboratory market forecasting ex...
We investigate the dynamics of a cobweb model with heterogeneous beliefs, generalizing the example o...
An economy exhibits structural heterogeneity when the forecasts of different agents have different e...
This note presents a simple example of a model in which the unique rational expectations (RE) steady...
This note presents a simple example of a model in which the unique rational expectations (RE) steady...
Evolutionary game theory provides a fresh perspective on the prospects that agents with hetero-geneo...
In this paper we deal with an Overlapping Generations Model with production under three diverse assu...
We investigate the dynamics of a cobweb model with heterogeneous beliefs, generalising the example o...
International audienceWithin the standard real business cycle model, we examine issues of expectatio...
Within the standard RBC model we examine issues of expectational coordination on the unique rational...
We investigate the stability properties of Muth's model of price movements when agents choose a prod...
Evolutionary game theory provides a fresh perspective on the prospects that agents with heterogeneou...
This paper studies a game theoretic model where agents choose between two updating rules to predict ...
We investigate the dynamics of a cobweb model with heterogeneous beliefs, generalizing the example o...
This paper analyzes the relationship between the expectational stability of rational expectations so...
In this paper we propose an explanation of the findings of a recent laboratory market forecasting ex...
We investigate the dynamics of a cobweb model with heterogeneous beliefs, generalizing the example o...
An economy exhibits structural heterogeneity when the forecasts of different agents have different e...