The number of cartels detected in the United States and in Europe has increased considerably since the introduction of corporate leniency programs in antitrust legislation. It cannot, however, be ruled out that this apparent success results in part from increased cartel activity. We explore the effects of corporate leniency programs on pricing and cartel activity by use of an experiment. We find that in the lab (i) fewer cartels are established when a leniency program is in place, and (ii) cartels that do exist are less successful in charging prices above the static Nash equilibrium price and have lower survival rates
Previous research exploring the effect of corporate leniency programs has modelled the oligopoly sta...
Leniency policies and rewards for whistleblowers are being introduced in ever more \u85elds of law e...
Antitrust authorities have set up leniency programs for cartel members that denounce their collusive...
The number of cartels detected in the United States and in Europe has increased considerably since t...
Recent laboratory experiments support the popular view that the introduction of corporate leniency p...
The purpose of this article is to survey recent experimental studies on leniency programs, which hav...
Previous research exploring the effect of corporate leniency programs has mod-elled the oligopoly st...
Previous research exploring the effect of corporate leniency programs has modelled the oligopoly sta...
Antitrust authorities in many countries have been trying to establish appropriate competition polici...
We present experimental evidence on the effectiveness of corporate leniency programs. Different from...
Leniency programs as a tool for cartel detection and cartel destabilization, have been implemented s...
Constructing a birth and death model of cartels, this paper examines the im-pact of a corporate leni...
Cartels remain widespread and constitute a major problem for society. Leniency policies reduce or ca...
This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schem...
The most significant violation of antitrust law in industrial economics is cartel formation. A price...
Previous research exploring the effect of corporate leniency programs has modelled the oligopoly sta...
Leniency policies and rewards for whistleblowers are being introduced in ever more \u85elds of law e...
Antitrust authorities have set up leniency programs for cartel members that denounce their collusive...
The number of cartels detected in the United States and in Europe has increased considerably since t...
Recent laboratory experiments support the popular view that the introduction of corporate leniency p...
The purpose of this article is to survey recent experimental studies on leniency programs, which hav...
Previous research exploring the effect of corporate leniency programs has mod-elled the oligopoly st...
Previous research exploring the effect of corporate leniency programs has modelled the oligopoly sta...
Antitrust authorities in many countries have been trying to establish appropriate competition polici...
We present experimental evidence on the effectiveness of corporate leniency programs. Different from...
Leniency programs as a tool for cartel detection and cartel destabilization, have been implemented s...
Constructing a birth and death model of cartels, this paper examines the im-pact of a corporate leni...
Cartels remain widespread and constitute a major problem for society. Leniency policies reduce or ca...
This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schem...
The most significant violation of antitrust law in industrial economics is cartel formation. A price...
Previous research exploring the effect of corporate leniency programs has modelled the oligopoly sta...
Leniency policies and rewards for whistleblowers are being introduced in ever more \u85elds of law e...
Antitrust authorities have set up leniency programs for cartel members that denounce their collusive...