This paper shows that in the classic symmetric and independent private value environments, the seller’s optimal reserve price is a decreasing function of the number of bidders in the first-price auctions when the seller and/or buyers are risk averse
In a general auction model in which bidders' signals are affiliated, we characterize the unique...
We study optimal public and secret reserve prices for risk averse sellers in second price auctions w...
We study optimal public and secret reserve prices for risk averse sellers in second price auctions w...
We analyze the effects of buyer and seller risk aversion in first- and second-price auctions in the ...
We analyze the effects of buyer and seller risk aversion in first- and second-price auctions in the ...
This paper analyzes the effects of buyer and seller risk aversion in first and second- price auction...
This paper analyzes the effects of buyer and seller risk aversion in first and second-price auctions...
This paper analyzes the effects of buyer and seller risk aversion in first and second-price auctions...
We show that risk aversion raises the public reserve price rp above the seller's cost c, but lowers ...
We show that risk aversion raises the public reserve price rp above the seller's cost c, but lowers ...
We show that risk aversion raises the public reserve price rp above the seller's cost c, but lowers ...
We study optimal public and secret reserve prices for risk averse sellers in second price auctions w...
© 2017 Elsevier B.V. We show that risk aversion raises the public reserve price rP above the seller'...
We consider second-price and first-price auctions in the symmetric independentprivate values framewo...
We consider second-price and first-price auctions in the symmetric independentprivate values framewo...
In a general auction model in which bidders' signals are affiliated, we characterize the unique...
We study optimal public and secret reserve prices for risk averse sellers in second price auctions w...
We study optimal public and secret reserve prices for risk averse sellers in second price auctions w...
We analyze the effects of buyer and seller risk aversion in first- and second-price auctions in the ...
We analyze the effects of buyer and seller risk aversion in first- and second-price auctions in the ...
This paper analyzes the effects of buyer and seller risk aversion in first and second- price auction...
This paper analyzes the effects of buyer and seller risk aversion in first and second-price auctions...
This paper analyzes the effects of buyer and seller risk aversion in first and second-price auctions...
We show that risk aversion raises the public reserve price rp above the seller's cost c, but lowers ...
We show that risk aversion raises the public reserve price rp above the seller's cost c, but lowers ...
We show that risk aversion raises the public reserve price rp above the seller's cost c, but lowers ...
We study optimal public and secret reserve prices for risk averse sellers in second price auctions w...
© 2017 Elsevier B.V. We show that risk aversion raises the public reserve price rP above the seller'...
We consider second-price and first-price auctions in the symmetric independentprivate values framewo...
We consider second-price and first-price auctions in the symmetric independentprivate values framewo...
In a general auction model in which bidders' signals are affiliated, we characterize the unique...
We study optimal public and secret reserve prices for risk averse sellers in second price auctions w...
We study optimal public and secret reserve prices for risk averse sellers in second price auctions w...
DOI
Add to ORKG