Add to ORKGLambertini and Trombetta (2002) extend Vickers’ (1985) Cournot model of strategic delegation to an infinitely repeated setting and conclude that delegation does not affect cartel stability if managers collude. This result rests on the assumption that managers are rational, but owners are not. This note shows that if owners behave fully rational, then delegation improves cartel stability if managers collude
In a model of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, I show how the existence of ...
Existing literature on managerial delegation indicates that collusive outcomes can be obtained in an...
In a model of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, I show how the existence of a...
In amodel of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, we showthat delegation has no ...
In a model of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, we show that delegation has n...
In a model of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, we show that delegation has n...
The effect of delegation on cartel stability is addressed in a duopoly for a homogeneous product, un...
We consider a two-stage market share delegation game with two competing firms. Each owner delegates ...
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) show that strategic delegation reduces firm profits in ...
We consider a two-stage market share delegation game with two competing firms. Each owner delegates ...
We consider a two-stage market share delegation game with two competing firms. Each owner delegates ...
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) show how strategic delegation in the one-shot Cournot g...
In a model of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, I show how the existence of ...
Existing literature on managerial delegation indicates that collusive outcomes can be obtained in an...
In a model of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, I show how the existence of a...
In amodel of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, we showthat delegation has no ...
In a model of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, we show that delegation has n...
In a model of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, we show that delegation has n...
The effect of delegation on cartel stability is addressed in a duopoly for a homogeneous product, un...
We consider a two-stage market share delegation game with two competing firms. Each owner delegates ...
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) show that strategic delegation reduces firm profits in ...
We consider a two-stage market share delegation game with two competing firms. Each owner delegates ...
We consider a two-stage market share delegation game with two competing firms. Each owner delegates ...
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) show how strategic delegation in the one-shot Cournot g...
In a model of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, I show how the existence of ...
Existing literature on managerial delegation indicates that collusive outcomes can be obtained in an...
In a model of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, I show how the existence of a...