Realism in economics: The new classical case

For the last few decades, considerable attention has been paid to the methodology of mainstream economics. It is not mere chance that economics is surrounded by methodological debates. If its relevance is at stake, this can be either refuted or proven most efficiently at a methodological level. Arguments for and against mainstream economics underline the methodological homogeneity of mainstream economics, while serious, though almost neglected, arguments can be found for a view according to which the long history of mainstream economics can be described as a sequence of methodological breaks. I argue, firstly, for a sharp demarcation by new classical macroeconomics from the Friedmanian instrumentalism and, secondly, for the realism of new classicals. I strive to identify the epistemological principles underlying Lucas’ models and to highlight the signs of that demarcation as well. I concentrate on the techniques by which new classicals could set their models into an indirect relationship with reality. It is also highlighted that the common terminology, according to which the assumptions of abstract economic models are uniformly regarded as “unrealistic”, actually refers to two different techniques. From these approaches, there is only one which can be justifiably labelled as realist