Add to ORKGThis paper investigates rational choice explanations for patterns of Supreme Court decision-making with respect to the appropriate level of judicial deference to administrative agency decisions. In particular, I assess empirically the thesis that the Supreme Court expands deference when the Supreme Court is ideologically closer to the executive than to the circuit courts, and contracts deference when the opposite is true. I find little to no evidence supporting this rational choice theory of judicial deference. Given this surprising null finding, I offer alternative explanations for the data and suggest directions for future research
In State Farm, the Supreme Court said that an agency decision is arbitrary and capricious if the age...
Many observers view the judiciary as the weakest branch of American government due to its inability ...
In this article, we examine an important threshold question in judicial behavior and administrative ...
The American administrative state of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is defined by deferenc...
The American administrative state of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is defined by deferenc...
In this article we follow the recent developments of the modern theory of administrative agencies, b...
In this essay, Pierce and Weiss report the results of a study of judicial review of agency interpret...
A large body of empirical evidence demonstrates that judicial review of agency action is highly poli...
Political scientists have developed increasingly sophisticated understandings of the influences on S...
In this essay, I discuss the meaning of ten empirical studies of judicial review of agency actions t...
Political scientists have developed increasingly sophisticated understandings of the influences on S...
The policy outputs resulting from the interaction between U.S. Courts of Appeals and federal adminis...
In Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , the Supreme Court famously held tha...
Over thirty years ago, the Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Counc...
Scholars focusing on court-agency relationships at the federal level have generally neglected the ro...
In State Farm, the Supreme Court said that an agency decision is arbitrary and capricious if the age...
Many observers view the judiciary as the weakest branch of American government due to its inability ...
In this article, we examine an important threshold question in judicial behavior and administrative ...
The American administrative state of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is defined by deferenc...
The American administrative state of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is defined by deferenc...
In this article we follow the recent developments of the modern theory of administrative agencies, b...
In this essay, Pierce and Weiss report the results of a study of judicial review of agency interpret...
A large body of empirical evidence demonstrates that judicial review of agency action is highly poli...
Political scientists have developed increasingly sophisticated understandings of the influences on S...
In this essay, I discuss the meaning of ten empirical studies of judicial review of agency actions t...
Political scientists have developed increasingly sophisticated understandings of the influences on S...
The policy outputs resulting from the interaction between U.S. Courts of Appeals and federal adminis...
In Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , the Supreme Court famously held tha...
Over thirty years ago, the Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Counc...
Scholars focusing on court-agency relationships at the federal level have generally neglected the ro...
In State Farm, the Supreme Court said that an agency decision is arbitrary and capricious if the age...
Many observers view the judiciary as the weakest branch of American government due to its inability ...
In this article, we examine an important threshold question in judicial behavior and administrative ...