Add to ORKGWe characterize essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria of generalized games with a continuum of players. As application, we rationalize the active participation of politically engaged individuals as the unique essential equilibrium in an electoral game with a continuum of Cournot-Nash equilibria
We introduce a framework of noncooperative pregames, in which players are characterized by their att...
In order to remedy the possible loss of strategic interaction in non-atomic games with a societal ch...
International audienceWhenever one deals with an interactive decision situation of long duration, on...
We characterize essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria for generalized games with a continuu...
We characterize the existence and the essential stability of Weak Pareto-Nash and Pareto-Nash equil...
We address the essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria for generalized games with a continuum...
We characterize Nash equilibria of games with a continuum of players in terms of approximate equilib...
Abstract. We consider a game with a continuum of players where at most a finite number of them are a...
We show that a strategy is a Nash equilibrium in a game with a continuum of players if and only if t...
We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibri...
Abstract. We characterize the competitive allocations of a continuum economy as the Nash equilibria ...
Whenever one deals with an interactive decision situation of long duration, one has to take into acc...
The notion of Nash equilibria plays a key role in the analysis of strategic interactions in the fram...
We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibri...
An approach initiated in [4] is shown to unify results about the existence of (i) Nash equilibria in...
We introduce a framework of noncooperative pregames, in which players are characterized by their att...
In order to remedy the possible loss of strategic interaction in non-atomic games with a societal ch...
International audienceWhenever one deals with an interactive decision situation of long duration, on...
We characterize essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria for generalized games with a continuu...
We characterize the existence and the essential stability of Weak Pareto-Nash and Pareto-Nash equil...
We address the essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria for generalized games with a continuum...
We characterize Nash equilibria of games with a continuum of players in terms of approximate equilib...
Abstract. We consider a game with a continuum of players where at most a finite number of them are a...
We show that a strategy is a Nash equilibrium in a game with a continuum of players if and only if t...
We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibri...
Abstract. We characterize the competitive allocations of a continuum economy as the Nash equilibria ...
Whenever one deals with an interactive decision situation of long duration, one has to take into acc...
The notion of Nash equilibria plays a key role in the analysis of strategic interactions in the fram...
We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibri...
An approach initiated in [4] is shown to unify results about the existence of (i) Nash equilibria in...
We introduce a framework of noncooperative pregames, in which players are characterized by their att...
In order to remedy the possible loss of strategic interaction in non-atomic games with a societal ch...
International audienceWhenever one deals with an interactive decision situation of long duration, on...