Shoemaker, Self-Blindness and Moore’s Paradox

I show how the \u27innersense\u27 (quasiperceptual) view of introspection can be defended against Shoemaker\u27s influential \u27argument from selfblindness\u27. If introspection and perception are analogous, the relationship between beliefs and introspective knowledge of them is merely contingent. Shoemaker argues that this implies the possibility that agents could be selfblind, i.e., could lack any introspective awareness of their own mental states. By invoking Moore\u27s paradox, he rejects this possibility. But because Shoemaker\u27s discussion conflates introspective awareness and selfknowledge, he cannot establish his conclusion. There is thirdperson evidence available to the selfblind which Shoemaker ignores, and it can account for the considerations from Moore\u27s paradox that he raises