It is shown that the equilibrium in the asymmetric two-player Tullock contest is unique for parameter values r ≤ 2. This allows proving a revenue ranking result saying that a revenue-maximizing designer capable of biasing the contest always prefers a technology with higher image
We study the effect of changes of players' information on the equilibrium efforts and payoffs of Tul...
We show that the optimal prize structure of symmetric n-player Tullock tournaments assigns the entir...
The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer (1989) contest is shown to admit a unique equilibrium. The supp...
It is shown that the equilibrium in the asymmetric Tullock contest is unique for parameter values r ...
It is shown that the equilibrium in the asymmetric two-player Tullock contest is unique for paramete...
We consider a symmetric two-player common-value setting where each player gets a private signal abou...
Under standard assumptions about players’ cost functions, we show that a Tullock contest with asymme...
We show that under standard assumptions a Tullock contest with asymmetric information has a pure st...
We show that under standard assumptions a Tullock contest with asymmetric information has a pure str...
I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with ...
In imperfectly discriminating contests with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive s...
We analyze the revenue-enhancing potential of favoring specific contestants in complete-information ...
We consider a best-of-three Tullock contest between two ex-ante identical players. An effort-maximiz...
The revenue ranking of asymmetric auctions with two heterogenous bidders is examined. The main theor...
We study Tullock’s (1980) n-player contest when each player has an independent prob-ability 0 < p...
We study the effect of changes of players' information on the equilibrium efforts and payoffs of Tul...
We show that the optimal prize structure of symmetric n-player Tullock tournaments assigns the entir...
The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer (1989) contest is shown to admit a unique equilibrium. The supp...
It is shown that the equilibrium in the asymmetric Tullock contest is unique for parameter values r ...
It is shown that the equilibrium in the asymmetric two-player Tullock contest is unique for paramete...
We consider a symmetric two-player common-value setting where each player gets a private signal abou...
Under standard assumptions about players’ cost functions, we show that a Tullock contest with asymme...
We show that under standard assumptions a Tullock contest with asymmetric information has a pure st...
We show that under standard assumptions a Tullock contest with asymmetric information has a pure str...
I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with ...
In imperfectly discriminating contests with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive s...
We analyze the revenue-enhancing potential of favoring specific contestants in complete-information ...
We consider a best-of-three Tullock contest between two ex-ante identical players. An effort-maximiz...
The revenue ranking of asymmetric auctions with two heterogenous bidders is examined. The main theor...
We study Tullock’s (1980) n-player contest when each player has an independent prob-ability 0 < p...
We study the effect of changes of players' information on the equilibrium efforts and payoffs of Tul...
We show that the optimal prize structure of symmetric n-player Tullock tournaments assigns the entir...
The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer (1989) contest is shown to admit a unique equilibrium. The supp...
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