Interactive diversity promotes the evolution of cooperation in structured populations

Evolutionary games on networks traditionally assume that each individual adopts an identical strategy to interact with all its neighbors in each generation. Considering the prevalent diversity of individual interactions in the real society, here we propose the concept of interactive diversity, which allows individuals to adopt different strategies against different neighbors in each generation. We investigate the evolution of cooperation based on the edge dynamics rather than the traditional nodal dynamics in networked systems. The results show that, without invoking any other mechanisms, interactive diversity drives the frequency of cooperation to a high level for a wide range of parameters in both well-mixed and structured populations. Even in highly connected populations, cooperation still thrives. When interactive diversity and large topological heterogeneity are combined together, however, in the relaxed social dilemma, cooperation level is lower than that with just one of them, implying that the combination of many promotive factors may make a worse outcome. By an analytical approximation, we get the condition under which interactive diversity provides more advantages for cooperation than traditional evolutionary dynamics does. Numerical simulations validating the approximation are also presented. Our work provides a new line to explore the latent relation between the ubiquitous cooperation and individuals' distinct responses in different interactions. The presented results suggest that interactive diversity should receive more attention in pursuing mechanisms fostering cooperation.National Natural Science Foundation (China) (Grants 61375120 and 61533001).China Scholarship Council (201406010195