Humanness and (im)morality in group relations

Tese de Doutoramento em Psicologia na área de especialidade - Psicologia SocialMorality is a valued dimension within and between groups (Ellemers, Pagliaro, & Barreto, 2013; Leach, Bilali, & Pagliaro, 2015), that has been consistently pointed out as part of what makes us uniquely human (Demoulin et al., 2004; Leyens et al., 2000; Haslam, 2006). On the other hand, the extent to which we see others as fully human also impacts on other’s moral status (Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, & Koval, 2011; Kelman, 1973; Opotow, 1990). The two dimensions seem to have a narrow relation, which has recently begun to capture more attention (Haslam, Bastian, Laham, & Loughnan, 2012; Khamitov, Rotman, & Piazza, 2016; Vasiljevic, & Viki, 2014). This thesis aims at analysing the relation between morality and humanness in group relations. A first research paper analysed the attribution and denial of moral traits to groups, integrating the role of humanness and valence in intergroup differentiation. By means of two studies we tested the hypothesis stating that within the moral domain, participants choose different strategies to differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup depending on trait humanness and valence. Our results support this hypothesis, as we found that participants attributed more uniquely human traits to the ingroup, but only in case these were positive; in case these were negative the uniquely human traits were more attributed to outgroups. In a second paper we analysed the relation between immorality and humanness, by using the evaluation of criminal behaviours as a proxy to address this relation. In our data, we found that Human Uniqueness and immorality did not correlate with each other. With this paper we also aimed at providing researchers with a range of validated stimuli to address these topics, which was exactly what we purposed ourselves to do in the last research paper presented in this thesis. In a third paper we analysed how ingroup members deal with ingroup deviance, integrating the role of ingroup threat. Specifically, we analysed the humanness perception of a deviant ingroup member that behaves in an immoral but uniquely human way. We found that when the deviant behaviour was less threatening, the ingroup members humanised the deviant as much as the ingroup itself. However, when the deviant behaviour represented a threat to the ingroup image, the ingroup members dehumanised more the deviant member. In a second study we analysed the dehumanisation of the ingroup deviant, regarding two different types of behaviours, which vary in humanness and immorality. In both studies we also measured the perception of moral blame of the deviant member, integrating our results with previous findings (Bastian, Denson, & Haslam, 2013). Finally we addressed the different intragroup strategies that ingroup members use to deal with threats to the ingroup image. Results are discussed in terms of their contribution to the relation between humanness and immorality, as well as the implications for dehumanisation theory. Future research is outlined