AbstractWe are concerned with two-level optimization problems, corresponding to nonzero-sum noncooperative games, in which the set of optimal solutions to the lower level problem is not a singleton. We are interested in Stackelberg solutions first introduced by H. Von Stackelberg in the context of economic competition. Our aim is to extend some approximation and existence results given by Loridan and Morgan by considering the case when the set of constraints in the upper level problem depends on the set of optimal solutions to the lower level problem
We propose a two-layer, semi-decentralized algorithm to compute a local solution to the Stackelberg ...
We propose a two-layer, semi-decentralized algorithm to compute a local solution to the Stackelberg ...
Optimization problems considered in the literature generally assume a passive environment that does ...
In a two-stage Stackelberg game, depending on the leader’s information about the choice of the follo...
In a two-stage Stackelberg game, depending on the leader’s information about the choice of the follo...
Abstract. We are concerned with two-level optimization problems called strong-weak Stackelberg probl...
Object of the present job is the study of optimization problems generated by games the Stackelberg a...
Object of the present job is the study of optimization problems generated by games the Stackelberg a...
Object of the present job is the study of optimization problems generated by games the Stackelberg a...
Object of the present job is the study of optimization problems generated by games the Stackelberg a...
In this chapter we consider a two-stage game with one leader and one (or more) followers and we inve...
We are concerned with two-level optimization problems called strongweak Stackelberg problems, genera...
In this chapter we consider a two-stage game with one leader and one (or more) followers and we inve...
The paper is devoted to inverse Stackelberg games with many players. We consider both static and dif...
The paper is devoted to inverse Stackelberg games with many players. We consider both static and dif...
We propose a two-layer, semi-decentralized algorithm to compute a local solution to the Stackelberg ...
We propose a two-layer, semi-decentralized algorithm to compute a local solution to the Stackelberg ...
Optimization problems considered in the literature generally assume a passive environment that does ...
In a two-stage Stackelberg game, depending on the leader’s information about the choice of the follo...
In a two-stage Stackelberg game, depending on the leader’s information about the choice of the follo...
Abstract. We are concerned with two-level optimization problems called strong-weak Stackelberg probl...
Object of the present job is the study of optimization problems generated by games the Stackelberg a...
Object of the present job is the study of optimization problems generated by games the Stackelberg a...
Object of the present job is the study of optimization problems generated by games the Stackelberg a...
Object of the present job is the study of optimization problems generated by games the Stackelberg a...
In this chapter we consider a two-stage game with one leader and one (or more) followers and we inve...
We are concerned with two-level optimization problems called strongweak Stackelberg problems, genera...
In this chapter we consider a two-stage game with one leader and one (or more) followers and we inve...
The paper is devoted to inverse Stackelberg games with many players. We consider both static and dif...
The paper is devoted to inverse Stackelberg games with many players. We consider both static and dif...
We propose a two-layer, semi-decentralized algorithm to compute a local solution to the Stackelberg ...
We propose a two-layer, semi-decentralized algorithm to compute a local solution to the Stackelberg ...
Optimization problems considered in the literature generally assume a passive environment that does ...