AbstractWe consider a general class of dynamic games arising in strategic capital accumulation/resource extraction, and show that they have Nash equilibria in pure stationary strategies.The approach is new and relies on Topkis' results in lattice programming and Tarski's fixed-point theorem
This chapter considers a recent trend in the application of stochastic games to economics characteri...
Several notions of game enjoy a Nash-like notion of equilibrium without guarantee of existence. Ther...
Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interacting agents ...
A general model for noncooperative extraction of common-property resource is considered. The main re...
This paper uses lattice programming methods along with the extension of Tarski's fixed point theorem...
In 1950, Nash proposed a natural equilibrium solution concept for games hence called Nash equilibriu...
Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interacting agents ...
Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interacting agents ...
In this paper a charactf'rization is given for equilibrium strategies in noncooperative dynamic game...
We show that a strategy is a Nash equilibrium in a game with a continuum of players if and only if t...
Hofbauer J, Oechssler J, Riedel F. Brown–von Neumann–Nash Dynamics: The Continuous Strategy Case. Ga...
Nash's Theorem guarantees the existence of Nash equilibria for strategic-form games. The typical pro...
This paper uses lattice programming methods along with the extension of Tarskis \u85xed point theore...
We show that a strategy is a Nash equilibrium in a game with a continuum of players if and only if t...
This paper presents a strategic growth model with endogenous time preference. Due to the potential l...
This chapter considers a recent trend in the application of stochastic games to economics characteri...
Several notions of game enjoy a Nash-like notion of equilibrium without guarantee of existence. Ther...
Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interacting agents ...
A general model for noncooperative extraction of common-property resource is considered. The main re...
This paper uses lattice programming methods along with the extension of Tarski's fixed point theorem...
In 1950, Nash proposed a natural equilibrium solution concept for games hence called Nash equilibriu...
Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interacting agents ...
Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interacting agents ...
In this paper a charactf'rization is given for equilibrium strategies in noncooperative dynamic game...
We show that a strategy is a Nash equilibrium in a game with a continuum of players if and only if t...
Hofbauer J, Oechssler J, Riedel F. Brown–von Neumann–Nash Dynamics: The Continuous Strategy Case. Ga...
Nash's Theorem guarantees the existence of Nash equilibria for strategic-form games. The typical pro...
This paper uses lattice programming methods along with the extension of Tarskis \u85xed point theore...
We show that a strategy is a Nash equilibrium in a game with a continuum of players if and only if t...
This paper presents a strategic growth model with endogenous time preference. Due to the potential l...
This chapter considers a recent trend in the application of stochastic games to economics characteri...
Several notions of game enjoy a Nash-like notion of equilibrium without guarantee of existence. Ther...
Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interacting agents ...
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