AbstractThe duopoly competition model presented in this paper tries to explain why a two-part tariff exists in the telecommunication industry. The investigation of competition and evolution between linear and two-part tariffs shows how the growth of the market and the sequence of action may affect equilibrium. The two pricing patterns are assumed to be virtual participants to constitute a tariff competition and evolution model, and by calculation, we can obtain metaphase equilibrium and evolution equilibrium. The conclusion shows that optimized Pareto equilibrium should be carried out by combining linear pricing and buffet pricing, this case being presented as a three-part tariff when many sub-markets coexist
The standard model by Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998) treats termination fees as an instrument to inc...
Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Communications, 2009, p. 1-5With the rapid devel...
The paper studies how second degree price discrimination can be implemented in a duopoly with differ...
AbstractThe duopoly competition model presented in this paper tries to explain why a two-part tariff...
This paper presents a framework to estimate an equilibrium oligopoly model of horizontal product dif...
We analyze two-part tariffs in an oligopoly, where each firm commits to a quantity and a fixed fee p...
We analyze two-part tariffs in an oligopoly, where each firm commits to a quantity and a fixed fee p...
We analyze two-part tariffs in oligopoly, where each firm commits to a certain quantity. The model i...
I study how firms actually compete in nonlinear tariffs by analyzing whether the incumbent and entra...
Two-part tariffs, when used at the retail level, increase efficiency by lowering the price of margin...
Two-sided market models in which platforms compete via two-part tariffs, i.e. a subscription and a p...
Typescript (photocopy).Recent developments in the telecommunications industry have generated a new i...
We present a flexible model of monopoly nonlinear pricing with endogenous participation decisions of...
The paper we consider traffic optimization problem for a model with multi-sided dynamic pricing in t...
Abstract—With the rapid development of wireless Internet services, several WLAN service providers ma...
The standard model by Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998) treats termination fees as an instrument to inc...
Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Communications, 2009, p. 1-5With the rapid devel...
The paper studies how second degree price discrimination can be implemented in a duopoly with differ...
AbstractThe duopoly competition model presented in this paper tries to explain why a two-part tariff...
This paper presents a framework to estimate an equilibrium oligopoly model of horizontal product dif...
We analyze two-part tariffs in an oligopoly, where each firm commits to a quantity and a fixed fee p...
We analyze two-part tariffs in an oligopoly, where each firm commits to a quantity and a fixed fee p...
We analyze two-part tariffs in oligopoly, where each firm commits to a certain quantity. The model i...
I study how firms actually compete in nonlinear tariffs by analyzing whether the incumbent and entra...
Two-part tariffs, when used at the retail level, increase efficiency by lowering the price of margin...
Two-sided market models in which platforms compete via two-part tariffs, i.e. a subscription and a p...
Typescript (photocopy).Recent developments in the telecommunications industry have generated a new i...
We present a flexible model of monopoly nonlinear pricing with endogenous participation decisions of...
The paper we consider traffic optimization problem for a model with multi-sided dynamic pricing in t...
Abstract—With the rapid development of wireless Internet services, several WLAN service providers ma...
The standard model by Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998) treats termination fees as an instrument to inc...
Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Communications, 2009, p. 1-5With the rapid devel...
The paper studies how second degree price discrimination can be implemented in a duopoly with differ...