AbstractUsing a lemma of J.S. Hwang we obtain a generalization of a theorem of Dubins and Freedman. It is shown that the core of the matching game is non-manipulable in a suitable sense by coalitions consisting of both men and women. A further strong stability property of the core is derived
We study many-to-one matching problems between institutions and individuals where an institution can...
In this note we introduceweak stability, a relaxation of the concept of stability for the marriage m...
[[abstract]]The stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that...
AbstractUsing a lemma of J.S. Hwang we obtain a generalization of a theorem of Dubins and Freedman. ...
Using a lemma of J.S. Hwang we obtain a generalization of a theorem of Dubins and Freedman. It is sh...
AbstractThe stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that no ...
AbstractIn the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage mo...
This paper defines a notion of semi-stability for matching problem with couples, which is a natural...
We study von Neumann Morgenstern stable sets for one-to-one matching problems under the assumption o...
The stable marriage problem (SMP) can be seen as a typical game, where each player wants to obtain t...
AbstractWe obtain a family of algorithms that determine stable matchings for the stable marriage pro...
When can a collection of matchings be stable, if preferences are unknown? This question lies behind ...
We show that, given two matchings for a room-mates problem of which say the second is stable, and gi...
In this paper, we introduce interdependent preferences to a classical one-to-one matching problem t...
Gale and Shapley introduced a matching problem between two sets of agents where each agent on one si...
We study many-to-one matching problems between institutions and individuals where an institution can...
In this note we introduceweak stability, a relaxation of the concept of stability for the marriage m...
[[abstract]]The stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that...
AbstractUsing a lemma of J.S. Hwang we obtain a generalization of a theorem of Dubins and Freedman. ...
Using a lemma of J.S. Hwang we obtain a generalization of a theorem of Dubins and Freedman. It is sh...
AbstractThe stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that no ...
AbstractIn the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage mo...
This paper defines a notion of semi-stability for matching problem with couples, which is a natural...
We study von Neumann Morgenstern stable sets for one-to-one matching problems under the assumption o...
The stable marriage problem (SMP) can be seen as a typical game, where each player wants to obtain t...
AbstractWe obtain a family of algorithms that determine stable matchings for the stable marriage pro...
When can a collection of matchings be stable, if preferences are unknown? This question lies behind ...
We show that, given two matchings for a room-mates problem of which say the second is stable, and gi...
In this paper, we introduce interdependent preferences to a classical one-to-one matching problem t...
Gale and Shapley introduced a matching problem between two sets of agents where each agent on one si...
We study many-to-one matching problems between institutions and individuals where an institution can...
In this note we introduceweak stability, a relaxation of the concept of stability for the marriage m...
[[abstract]]The stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that...
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