AbstractWe study the complexity of the following problem: Given two weighted voting games G′ and G″ that each contain a player p, in which of these games is p’s power index value higher? We study this problem with respect to both the Shapley–Shubik power index and the Banzhaf power index. Our main result is that for both of these power indices the problem is complete for probabilistic polynomial time (i.e., is PP-complete). We apply our results to partially resolve some recently proposed problems regarding the complexity of weighted voting games. We also study the complexity of the raw Shapley–Shubik power index. Deng and Papadimitriou showed that the raw Shapley–Shubik power index is #P-metric-complete. We strengthen this by showing that t...
Abstract. The Shapley value and Banzhaf index are two well known indices for measuring the power a p...
AbstractIn this paper, we prove that both problems for calculating the Banzhaf power index and the S...
The Shapley–Shubik power index in a voting situation depends on the number of orderings in which eac...
AbstractWe study the complexity of the following problem: Given two weighted voting games G′ and G″ ...
Weighted voting games are a family of cooperative games, typically used to model voting situations ...
We consider weighted voting games with n players. We show how to compute the Banzhaf power index for...
We consider weighted voting games with n players. We show how to compute the Banzhaf power index for...
We consider weighted voting games with n players. We show how to compute the Banzhaf power index for...
Weighted voting games are a family of cooperative games, typically used to model voting situations w...
We study the efficient computation of power indices for weighted voting games using the paradigm of ...
Coalitions of weighted voting games can be restricted to be connected components of a graph. As a co...
The Shapley value and Banzhaf index are two well known indices for measuring the power a player has ...
We study the efficient computation of power indices for weighted voting games using the paradigm of ...
Abstract For measuring an individual's voting power of a voting game, some power indices are pr...
The Shapley value and Banzhaf index are two well known indices for measuring the power a player has ...
Abstract. The Shapley value and Banzhaf index are two well known indices for measuring the power a p...
AbstractIn this paper, we prove that both problems for calculating the Banzhaf power index and the S...
The Shapley–Shubik power index in a voting situation depends on the number of orderings in which eac...
AbstractWe study the complexity of the following problem: Given two weighted voting games G′ and G″ ...
Weighted voting games are a family of cooperative games, typically used to model voting situations ...
We consider weighted voting games with n players. We show how to compute the Banzhaf power index for...
We consider weighted voting games with n players. We show how to compute the Banzhaf power index for...
We consider weighted voting games with n players. We show how to compute the Banzhaf power index for...
Weighted voting games are a family of cooperative games, typically used to model voting situations w...
We study the efficient computation of power indices for weighted voting games using the paradigm of ...
Coalitions of weighted voting games can be restricted to be connected components of a graph. As a co...
The Shapley value and Banzhaf index are two well known indices for measuring the power a player has ...
We study the efficient computation of power indices for weighted voting games using the paradigm of ...
Abstract For measuring an individual's voting power of a voting game, some power indices are pr...
The Shapley value and Banzhaf index are two well known indices for measuring the power a player has ...
Abstract. The Shapley value and Banzhaf index are two well known indices for measuring the power a p...
AbstractIn this paper, we prove that both problems for calculating the Banzhaf power index and the S...
The Shapley–Shubik power index in a voting situation depends on the number of orderings in which eac...