AbstractThis paper shows that buying from a team of sellers can be optimal for the buyer in a static model where the buyer has private information about quality, sellers have private information about the cost and choice of effort, and quality is not contractible
Food risks may be caused by moral hazard, i.e. by opportunistic behaviour of upstream sellers who ex...
Contract farming is increasingly used to coordinate transactions between farmers and buyers downstre...
textabstractThis paper compares the product quality provision of cooperatives and investor owned fir...
AbstractThis paper shows that buying from a team of sellers can be optimal for the buyer in a static...
This paper examines a market where buyers cannot judge the quality of the good they receive until af...
This paper investigates the role of output quality control in a multi agent setting with moral hazar...
In the presence of moral hazard, the optimal contract for a durable-goods monopolist is a lease with...
This paper develops a double-sided moral hazard model of share contract in agriculture, with imperfe...
A principal hires an agent to acquire soft information about an unknown state. Even though neither h...
The objective of this paper is to analyze the effect of linear sharing contracts when d...
This paper studies the decision of a firm that sells an experience good to delegate quality control ...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2009."September 2009." C...
Abstract — This paper develops a double-sided moral hazard model of share contract in agriculture, w...
This paper displays a linear demand oligopoly model, in which firms endogenously decide whether to e...
This study analyzes a continuous–time N–agent Brownian moral hazard model with constant absolute ris...
Food risks may be caused by moral hazard, i.e. by opportunistic behaviour of upstream sellers who ex...
Contract farming is increasingly used to coordinate transactions between farmers and buyers downstre...
textabstractThis paper compares the product quality provision of cooperatives and investor owned fir...
AbstractThis paper shows that buying from a team of sellers can be optimal for the buyer in a static...
This paper examines a market where buyers cannot judge the quality of the good they receive until af...
This paper investigates the role of output quality control in a multi agent setting with moral hazar...
In the presence of moral hazard, the optimal contract for a durable-goods monopolist is a lease with...
This paper develops a double-sided moral hazard model of share contract in agriculture, with imperfe...
A principal hires an agent to acquire soft information about an unknown state. Even though neither h...
The objective of this paper is to analyze the effect of linear sharing contracts when d...
This paper studies the decision of a firm that sells an experience good to delegate quality control ...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2009."September 2009." C...
Abstract — This paper develops a double-sided moral hazard model of share contract in agriculture, w...
This paper displays a linear demand oligopoly model, in which firms endogenously decide whether to e...
This study analyzes a continuous–time N–agent Brownian moral hazard model with constant absolute ris...
Food risks may be caused by moral hazard, i.e. by opportunistic behaviour of upstream sellers who ex...
Contract farming is increasingly used to coordinate transactions between farmers and buyers downstre...
textabstractThis paper compares the product quality provision of cooperatives and investor owned fir...
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