AbstractThe combination of evidence problem is treated here as the construction of a posterior possibility function (or probability function, as a special case) describing an unknown state parameter vector of interest. This function exhibits the appropriate components contributing to knowledge of the parameter, including conditions or inference rules, relating the parameter with observable characteristics or attributes, and errors or confidences of observed or reported data. Multivalued logic operators - in particular, disjunction, conjunction, and implication operators, where needed – are used to connect these components and structure the posterior function. Typically, these operators are well-defined for only a finite number of arguments....
AbstractWe show that the principle of maximum U-uncertainty for ampliative possibilistic reasoning c...
1 Uncertain knowledge can be modeled by using graded probabilities rather than binary truth-values, ...
One central issue in philosophy of probability concerns the interpretation of the very notion of pro...
AbstractThe combination of evidence problem is treated here as the construction of a posterior possi...
AbstractThis paper studies a certain form of evidence theory using exponential possibility distribut...
We develop a new outlook on the use of experts’ probabilities for inference, distinguishing the info...
A Bayesian measure of evidence for precise hypotheses is presented. The intention is to give a Bayes...
In this paper we consider the inference rules of System P in the framework of coherent imprecise pro...
AbstractStatistical problems were at the origin of the mathematical theory of evidence, or Dempster–...
AbstractThis article tries to clarify some aspects of the theory of belief functions especially with...
An agent often has a number of hypotheses, and must choose among them based on observations, or outc...
Probability can be viewed as a multi-valued logic that extends binary Boolean propositional logic t...
AbstractThe application of formal inference procedures, such as Bayes Theorem, requires that a judgm...
Abstract: A Bayesian measure of evidence for precise hypotheses is presented. The intention is to gi...
summary:Probability logic studies the properties resulting from the probabilistic interpretation of ...
AbstractWe show that the principle of maximum U-uncertainty for ampliative possibilistic reasoning c...
1 Uncertain knowledge can be modeled by using graded probabilities rather than binary truth-values, ...
One central issue in philosophy of probability concerns the interpretation of the very notion of pro...
AbstractThe combination of evidence problem is treated here as the construction of a posterior possi...
AbstractThis paper studies a certain form of evidence theory using exponential possibility distribut...
We develop a new outlook on the use of experts’ probabilities for inference, distinguishing the info...
A Bayesian measure of evidence for precise hypotheses is presented. The intention is to give a Bayes...
In this paper we consider the inference rules of System P in the framework of coherent imprecise pro...
AbstractStatistical problems were at the origin of the mathematical theory of evidence, or Dempster–...
AbstractThis article tries to clarify some aspects of the theory of belief functions especially with...
An agent often has a number of hypotheses, and must choose among them based on observations, or outc...
Probability can be viewed as a multi-valued logic that extends binary Boolean propositional logic t...
AbstractThe application of formal inference procedures, such as Bayes Theorem, requires that a judgm...
Abstract: A Bayesian measure of evidence for precise hypotheses is presented. The intention is to gi...
summary:Probability logic studies the properties resulting from the probabilistic interpretation of ...
AbstractWe show that the principle of maximum U-uncertainty for ampliative possibilistic reasoning c...
1 Uncertain knowledge can be modeled by using graded probabilities rather than binary truth-values, ...
One central issue in philosophy of probability concerns the interpretation of the very notion of pro...