Ik ken jou, jij kent mij – Reputatie informatie als indirecte controle

This dissertation investigates how reputation information can be used as a control tool to diminish the risk of being exploited by an opportunistic seller. In business transactions, there is an information-asymmetry between buyers and sellers that sellers can exploit, when buyers cannot assess the quality of the product or service up-front. Chapter One focuses on how formal control systems are related to long-term relationships based on relational contracting and reputation, and examines how market competition effects the length of these relationships. Chapter Two investigates how a reputation information system that publically discloses the sellers’ reputation and price competition impacts the formation of efficient relational contracts as measured by buyer trust, seller trustworthiness and market efficiency. Chapter Three examines whether voluntary reputation information reporting can be increased by financially rewarding buyers in return for feedback and by changing the design of the reputation information system from unilateral (only buyers can rate sellers) to bilateral (buyers can rate sellers and vice versa). Overall, this thesis provides insights to managers, buyers and sellers in offline and online market places which help them evaluate and exploit the impact of reputation information to manage the information asymmetry present in many of these markets.status: publishe