On investment, uncertainty, and strategic interaction with applications in energy markets

The thesis presents dynamic models on investment under uncertainty with the focus on strategic interaction and energy market applications. The uncertainty is modelled using stochastic processes as state variables. The specific questions analyzed include the effect of technological and revenue related uncertainties on the optimal timing of investment, the irreversibility in the choice between alternative investment projects with different degrees of uncertainty, and the effect of strategic interaction on the initiating of discrete investment projects, on the abandonment of a project, and on incremental capacity investments. The main methodological feature is the incorporation of game theoretic concepts in the theory of investment. It is argued that such an approach is often desirable in terms of real applications, because many industries are characterized by both uncertainty and strategic interaction between the firms. Besides extending the theory of investment, this line of work may be seen as an extension of the theory of industrial organization towards the direction that views market stability as one of the factors explaining rational behaviour of the firms.reviewe