We study regulatory enforcement actions issued against US banks to show that both board monitoring and advising are effective in preventing misconduct by banks. While better monitoring by boards prevents all categories of misconduct, better advising prevents misconduct of a technical nature. Board monitoring increases the likelihood that misconduct is detected, increases the penalties imposed on the CEO, and alleviates shareholder wealth losses following the detection of misconduct by regulators. Our article offers novel insights on how to structure bank boards to prevent bank misconduct.PostprintPeer reviewe
This study examines the impact of board busyness (i.e. multiple directorships of outside board membe...
Based on the hand-collected board structure data of 277 listed banks across 55 countries, and the ba...
The authors are grateful to Dick Davies, Paul Draper, Robert Faff, David Hillier, Ike Mathur (the ed...
We study regulatory enforcement actions issued against US banks to show that both board monitoring a...
Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: Do enforcement actions impact banks’ board ...
This paper investigates whether gender-diverse bank boards can play a role in preventing costly misc...
We examine the minutes of Indian banks' board meetings and offer insights into the issues tabled and...
This paper investigates whether gender-diverse bank boards can play a role in preventing costly misc...
This paper investigates corporate reactions to bank misconduct episodes. We test whether more divers...
This thesis consists of three essays on the performance implications of senior decision-makers in t...
Enforcement actions (sanctions) aim to penalize guilty companies and provide examples to other compa...
Increasingly, in the last decade, largely due to perceived greater shareholder pressures for more pr...
Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: The specific monitoring effect of boards of...
Abstract Research Question/Issue: Do enforcement actions impact banks' board composition? Based on ...
Financial misconduct and systemic risk are two critical issues in financial regulation today. Howeve...
This study examines the impact of board busyness (i.e. multiple directorships of outside board membe...
Based on the hand-collected board structure data of 277 listed banks across 55 countries, and the ba...
The authors are grateful to Dick Davies, Paul Draper, Robert Faff, David Hillier, Ike Mathur (the ed...
We study regulatory enforcement actions issued against US banks to show that both board monitoring a...
Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: Do enforcement actions impact banks’ board ...
This paper investigates whether gender-diverse bank boards can play a role in preventing costly misc...
We examine the minutes of Indian banks' board meetings and offer insights into the issues tabled and...
This paper investigates whether gender-diverse bank boards can play a role in preventing costly misc...
This paper investigates corporate reactions to bank misconduct episodes. We test whether more divers...
This thesis consists of three essays on the performance implications of senior decision-makers in t...
Enforcement actions (sanctions) aim to penalize guilty companies and provide examples to other compa...
Increasingly, in the last decade, largely due to perceived greater shareholder pressures for more pr...
Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: The specific monitoring effect of boards of...
Abstract Research Question/Issue: Do enforcement actions impact banks' board composition? Based on ...
Financial misconduct and systemic risk are two critical issues in financial regulation today. Howeve...
This study examines the impact of board busyness (i.e. multiple directorships of outside board membe...
Based on the hand-collected board structure data of 277 listed banks across 55 countries, and the ba...
The authors are grateful to Dick Davies, Paul Draper, Robert Faff, David Hillier, Ike Mathur (the ed...