Add to ORKGSection Four of the Clayton Act,2 the treble-damage action provision of the federal antitrust laws, was intended to foster and encourage competition by allowing private enforcement of the antitrust laws. The ever-present threat of a private action for treble-damages serves as a deterrent to anyone contemplating business activities in violation of the antitrust laws and offers the possibility of compensation to victims injured by anti-competitive activities.3 The Supreme Court\u27s decision in illinois Brick Co. v. lllinois4 defined the reach of the trebledamage provision by holding that only direct purchasers of illegally monopolized products or services have standing to sue under Section Four of the Clayton Ac
In its landmark ruling in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois in 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court restricted ...
Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 713 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1278...
In 1970, a district court observed: We must confess at the outset that we find antitrust standing c...
Section Four of the Clayton Act,2 the treble-damage action provision of the federal antitrust laws, ...
In Illinois Brick v. Illinois Co., the Supreme Court held that, under federal antitrust law, only di...
The article discusses a court case Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, where in the U.S. Supreme Court d...
Section 7 of the Sherman Act, as amended by section 4 of the Clayton Act, gives a private right of a...
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the pass-on theory may not be used offensively ...
The landmark case of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, which denied standing to indirect purchasers to...
In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that, except in special circumstances, onl...
In 1976, Congress passed the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Enforcement Act. This Act empowered state a...
Plaintiffs, corporate distributors, sought treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act, allegi...
In its landmark ruling in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois in 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court restricted ...
In 1982, Congress enacted the Foreign Antitrust Trade Improvements Act (FTAIA) to resolve uncertaint...
In a recent treatment of exclusive dealing arrangements, Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., the ...
In its landmark ruling in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois in 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court restricted ...
Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 713 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1278...
In 1970, a district court observed: We must confess at the outset that we find antitrust standing c...
Section Four of the Clayton Act,2 the treble-damage action provision of the federal antitrust laws, ...
In Illinois Brick v. Illinois Co., the Supreme Court held that, under federal antitrust law, only di...
The article discusses a court case Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, where in the U.S. Supreme Court d...
Section 7 of the Sherman Act, as amended by section 4 of the Clayton Act, gives a private right of a...
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the pass-on theory may not be used offensively ...
The landmark case of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, which denied standing to indirect purchasers to...
In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that, except in special circumstances, onl...
In 1976, Congress passed the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Enforcement Act. This Act empowered state a...
Plaintiffs, corporate distributors, sought treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act, allegi...
In its landmark ruling in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois in 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court restricted ...
In 1982, Congress enacted the Foreign Antitrust Trade Improvements Act (FTAIA) to resolve uncertaint...
In a recent treatment of exclusive dealing arrangements, Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., the ...
In its landmark ruling in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois in 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court restricted ...
Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 713 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1278...
In 1970, a district court observed: We must confess at the outset that we find antitrust standing c...