Some Distributional Consequences of Collective Rights in Artisanal Fisheries

Suggested Bibliographic Reference: Challenging New Frontiers in the Global Seafood Sector: Proceedings of the Eighteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, July 11-15, 2016. Compiled by Stefani J. Evers and Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade (IIFET), Corvallis, 2016.Proceedings of the Eighteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, held July 11-15, 2016 at Aberdeen Exhibition and Conference Center (AECC), Aberdeen, Scotland, UK.This paper analyzes the equity consequences of different fishing quota distributions among artisanal fisher organizations. We develop a basic model to analyze optimal decisions with a collective fishing rights system. With this model as a conceptual framework, using a Theil index as a distributive measure, and employing optimization techniques we calculate the differences that arise in the distribution of income and landings with different quota assignment rules: efficient quotas (within the organization), individual quotas, and initial allocation based on historical assignments (with no transferability). The model is based on the common sardine and anchovies artisanal fisheries of central – southern Chile. The analysis of the results allows discussing and comparing the equity implications of these three allocation systems