We present a tool supporting the verification of programs written in stack-based assembly language against the secure information flow property. First, the tool builds the transition system, which corresponds to an abstract execution of the program, embodying security information and abstracting from the actual values. Then the states of the abstract transition system are checked to detect the satisfaction of the secure information flow property. The tool offers a windows user interface, through which the user can control the verification process, and observe the intermediate and final results
We give a formal definition of the notion of information flow for a simple guarded command language....
We propose a method to check secure information flow in concurrent programs with synchronization. T...
Verifying secure information flow by reducing it to safety verification is a popular approach, based...
This paper presents an approach to analyze stack-based assembly code with respect to leakages of pri...
AbstractWe propose a method to analyze secure information flow in stack-based assembly languages, co...
This paper presents a technique for verifying secure information flow in concurrent programs consist...
Abstract. We study secure information flow in a stack based Typed Assembly Language (TAL). We define...
We present a method based on abstract interpretation to check secure information flow in programs wi...
Abstract. Non-interference is a desirable property of systems in a multilevel security architecture,...
It is common to prove by reasoning over source code that programs do not leak sensitive data. But do...
Abstract. We present a method for analyzing assembly programs obtained by compilation and checking s...
Many software systems adopt isolation mechanisms of modern processors as software security building ...
Many software systems adopt isolation mechanisms of modern processors as software security building ...
Many software systems adopt isolation mechanisms of modern processors as software security building ...
AbstractA classic problem in security is that of checking that a program has secure information flow...
We give a formal definition of the notion of information flow for a simple guarded command language....
We propose a method to check secure information flow in concurrent programs with synchronization. T...
Verifying secure information flow by reducing it to safety verification is a popular approach, based...
This paper presents an approach to analyze stack-based assembly code with respect to leakages of pri...
AbstractWe propose a method to analyze secure information flow in stack-based assembly languages, co...
This paper presents a technique for verifying secure information flow in concurrent programs consist...
Abstract. We study secure information flow in a stack based Typed Assembly Language (TAL). We define...
We present a method based on abstract interpretation to check secure information flow in programs wi...
Abstract. Non-interference is a desirable property of systems in a multilevel security architecture,...
It is common to prove by reasoning over source code that programs do not leak sensitive data. But do...
Abstract. We present a method for analyzing assembly programs obtained by compilation and checking s...
Many software systems adopt isolation mechanisms of modern processors as software security building ...
Many software systems adopt isolation mechanisms of modern processors as software security building ...
Many software systems adopt isolation mechanisms of modern processors as software security building ...
AbstractA classic problem in security is that of checking that a program has secure information flow...
We give a formal definition of the notion of information flow for a simple guarded command language....
We propose a method to check secure information flow in concurrent programs with synchronization. T...
Verifying secure information flow by reducing it to safety verification is a popular approach, based...