Unto the Least of These: Animal Suffering and the Problem of Evil

In this dissertation I argue that animal pain and suffering pose a greater problem for God\u27s goodness than has been generally acknowledged in the history of the discussion of the problem of evil. I take David Hume\u27s abductive approach to the problem of evil as my model and compare two explanations for the evidence of animal suffering--the hypothesis of indifference and classical theism. I argue that theism is a poor fit with the total evidence--evidence that includes animal suffering. I argue that there are certain features of the world that are surprising on the hypothesis that a perfectly good, all-powerful being governs the universe. Among these features are the pain and suffering of sentient animals, the phenomena of predation, and the mechanism of evolution by natural selection. Given that there is an alternate hypothesis that is a better fit with the data, it is unreasonable to accept theism. Then I evaluate some of the best attempts to diffuse the problem of animal suffering--I survey various theodicies and defenses designed to raise the probability of theism on the evidence of animal suffering including Peter van Inwagen\u27s modal and moral skeptical defense, Michael Murray\u27s neo-Carteisian defense and evolutionary goods defense and Richard Swinburne\u27s animal virtue theodicy. I conclude that each of the theodicies and defenses are highly implausible and, therefore, fail to raise the probability of theism relative to the evidence. I conclude that the prospects for theodicies and defenses are dim. Unless the theist has recourse to some very strong argument for the existence of an all-good God, I argue that it unreasonable to believe in the God of classical theism