Recognition Theory and Contemporary French Moral and Political Philosophy: Reopening the Dialogue

International audienceThe revival of recognition theory has brought new energy to critical theory. In general terms, recognition theory aims to evaluate social structures critically, against a standard of social freedom identified with norms of interaction freely recognised by all parties. Until now, attention has primarily focused on the categories and forms of recognition theory. However, the influence of contemporary French theory upon the development of theories of recognition has not yet received the consideration it merits. The book, co-edited with M. Bankovsky (La Trobe University), takes up this task. With chapters by internationally recognised authors, the collection outlines the current state of recognition theory, studies the impact of French theory, and uses French thought to identify aspects of the recognitive process that are often overlooked. Exploring French accounts of agonistic identity construction, vulnerability, power, ethical obligation and reflexive theory construction, this book supports the intentions of critical theory with heightened attentiveness to oppression in all of its forms.Within the framework of such a project, developed with M. Bankovsky, my own specific contribution is entitled “Sartre and Honneth on Conflict and Recognition”. Axel Honneth, primarily responsible for the contemporary renewal of recognition theory, has stated that he drew inspiration from Sartre, but he has also professed to overcome some limitations of the Sartrean approach: mainly, such an approach would overlook the possible resolution of conflict into stable and positive forms of mutual recognition. My chapter develops an interpretation of Sartre’s philosophy that turns out to be slightly different from Honneth’s. I show that a Sartrean perspective can bring to light certain blind spots of recognition theory, focusing on the problem of reification and the question of identity. First, I focus on the way Sartre delineates a phenomenology of what could be called “ordinary” reification: in so doing, he helps us develop a more realistic account of the way in which even positive forms of recognition relations are inseparable from the threat of objectification. In this sense, Sartre promise to remedy the limits of Honneth’s overly optimistic account of recognition. On such a basis, my contribution shows how Sartre’s philosophy paves the way for the exploration of ideas that could enhance current debates on recognition: I thus argue that Sartre’s attention to the conflictual nature of recognition relations can contribute to the further development of approaches that are critical of the fixation on identity, thus focusing attention on the agonistic dimension of recognition and defending an approach to struggles for recognition that is more pluralistic and differentiated than the one Honneth suggests