Is New Governance the Ideal Architecture for Global Financial Regulation?

A central challenge for international financial regulatory systems today is how to manage the impact of global systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs) on the global economy, given the interconnected and pluralistic nature of regulatory regimes. This paper focuses on the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and proposes a new research agenda for the FSB’s emerging regulatory forms. In particular, it examines the regulatory architecture of the New Governance (NG), a variety of approaches that are supposed to be more reflexive, collaborative, and experimental than traditional forms of governance. A preliminary conclu-sion is that NG tools may be effective in resolving some kinds of problems in a pluralistic regulatory order, but they are unlikely to be suitable for all problems. As such, this article proposes that analyses of the precise condi-tions in which NG mechanisms may or may not be effective are necessary