Moral Psychology Must Not Be Based on Faith and Hope: Commentary

Narvaez (2010, this issue) calls for a moral psychology in which reasoning and intuitions are equal partners. But empirical research on the power of implicit processes and on the weakness of everyday reasoning indicates that the partnership is far from equal. The ancient rationalist faith that good reasoning can be taught and that it will lead to improved behavior is no longer justified. The social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001) is a more realistic portrayal of the ways that moral intuition and reasoning work together. Keywords moral psychology, intuitionism, rationalism It’s hard to think of an academic dispute in which somebody didn’t try to split the difference, bridge the gap, or call for balance. That’s a laudable goal and an effective heuristic. When two well-intentioned, well-informed people or groups disagree, the odds are that each side really is right on some points and wrong on others. In the debate between rationalism and intuitionism, Darci