FOR THE

This research investigates the emergence of retail clusters on supply chains comprised of suppliers, retailers, and consumers. An agent-based model is employed to study retail lo-cation choice in a market of homogeneous goods and a market of complementary goods. On a circle comprised of discrete locales, retailers play a non-cooperative game by choos-ing locales to maximize profits which are impacted by their distance to consumers and to suppliers. The findings disclose that in a market of homogeneous products symmetric distri-butions of retail clusters rise out of competition between individual retailers; average cluster density and cluster size change dynamically as retailers enter the market. In a market of two complementary goods, multiple equilibria of retail distributions are found to be com-mon; a single cluster of retailers has the highest probability to emerge. Overall, my results demonstrate that retail clusters emerge from the balance between retailers ’ proximity to their customers, their competitors, their complements, and their suppliers. i Acknowledgemen