ESSAYS ON ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND EDUCATION

The first essay tests whether the returns to education are different between entrepreneurs and regular employees. If the signaling model of education is correct, entrepreneurs should receive lower returns from education (relative to employees) because they have no need to signal their productivity to an employer. However, this result should only hold if the researcher is able to control for selection into self-employment and the endogeneity of ed-ucation. This is illustrated using a stylized model of signaling. The relationship between self-employment and the returns to education is tested using data from the 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation. This rich panel dataset makes it possible to control for many business-specific characteristics, like business equity, that have been previously unaccounted for in the literature. Ordinary least squares regressions find the correlation between education and earnings to be weaker for entrepreneurs. To control for selection, I utilize a Heckman selection model using spousal health insurance and housing equity as instruments. It shows that selection biases downward the correlation between education and income for entrepreneurs. Finally, a fixed effects model is employed to control for an