Abstract: This paper considers the problem of a monopoly matchmaker that uses a schedule of entrance fees to sort different types of agents on the two sides of a matching market into exclusive meeting places, where agents randomly form pairwise matches. We make the standard assumption that the match value function exhibits complementarities, so that matching types at equal percentiles maximizes total match value and is efficient. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the revenue-maximizing sorting to be efficient. These conditions require complementarities in the match value function to be sufficiently strong along the efficient matching path
Economists wish to use data on matches to learn about the structural primitives that govern sort-ing...
In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions in whi...
We consider centralized matching markets in which, starting from an arbitrary match¬ing, firms are s...
We study how competing matchmakers use prices to sort participants into search markets, where they f...
We study centralized many-to-many matching in markets where agents have private informa-tion about (...
We analyze the trade-off between monopoly and competition in matching markets where one side is exem...
We investigate the role of search frictions in markets with price competition and how it leads to so...
We investigate under which conditions price competition leads to sorting of buyers and sellers. In a...
We study centralized many-to-many matching in markets where agents have private information about (v...
We consider a simple market where a vendor offers multiple variants of a certain product and prefere...
A platform matches agents from two sides of a market to create a trading opportunity between them. T...
We study centralized many-to-many matching in markets where agents have private infor-mation about (...
This paper analyzes the provision of matching services in a model of two-sided search. Agents belong...
When potential bidders for a target firm are heterogeneous, standard auction methods for selling the...
In this paper, we introduce a novel, non-recursive, maximal matching algorithm for double auctions, ...
Economists wish to use data on matches to learn about the structural primitives that govern sort-ing...
In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions in whi...
We consider centralized matching markets in which, starting from an arbitrary match¬ing, firms are s...
We study how competing matchmakers use prices to sort participants into search markets, where they f...
We study centralized many-to-many matching in markets where agents have private informa-tion about (...
We analyze the trade-off between monopoly and competition in matching markets where one side is exem...
We investigate the role of search frictions in markets with price competition and how it leads to so...
We investigate under which conditions price competition leads to sorting of buyers and sellers. In a...
We study centralized many-to-many matching in markets where agents have private information about (v...
We consider a simple market where a vendor offers multiple variants of a certain product and prefere...
A platform matches agents from two sides of a market to create a trading opportunity between them. T...
We study centralized many-to-many matching in markets where agents have private infor-mation about (...
This paper analyzes the provision of matching services in a model of two-sided search. Agents belong...
When potential bidders for a target firm are heterogeneous, standard auction methods for selling the...
In this paper, we introduce a novel, non-recursive, maximal matching algorithm for double auctions, ...
Economists wish to use data on matches to learn about the structural primitives that govern sort-ing...
In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions in whi...
We consider centralized matching markets in which, starting from an arbitrary match¬ing, firms are s...