Article Authenticity of cultures and of persons

In this article I argue that it does not make sense – either empirically or normatively – to speak of ‘authentic ’ cultures. All we need when talking about cultures is a relatively weak concept that still carries enough normative weight to function as the meaningful background of a person’s identity, autonomy and good life. Discussing the authentic culture, I refer to the debates around the German Leitkultur as well as the Dutch populist movement as examples. However, I am interested not only in the concept of the authenticity of a culture but also in the concept of the authenticity of persons: if an ‘authentic culture ’ is not feasible, does this have repercussions on the concept of the autonomy and authenticity of persons? In suggesting that this might be the case, I argue that persons can be autonomous without always being fully authentic. Keywords autonomy, cultural authenticity, personal authenticity, recognition The reference to or insistence on cultural authenticity often leads to resentment vis-a-vis strangers who are viewed as endangering the authentic culture, destryoing what is valu-able, good and familiar. Authenticity leads to resentment if ‘authentic culture ’ is under-stood in an essentialist way and if the authenticity and essence of the culture are conceived of as values in themselves. In this article I will argue that it does not make sense – either empirically or norma-tively – to speak of ‘authentic ’ cultures. All we need when talking about cultures is a relatively weak concept that still carries enough normative weight to function as the meaningful background of a person’s identity, autonomy and good life. However, I Corresponding author