Probative, Dialectic, and Moral Reasoning in Program Evaluation

Current idealized evaluation practices are often modeled on a probative, criteria and standards-based approach endorsed by Michael Scriven. The authors find this logical, rule-governed approach insufficient for most program evaluations. By focusing on more technical aspects of the evaluand and the evaluative process, important and valid evaluand characteristics and stakeholder viewpoints can be lost or marginalized. The authors believe a dialectical evaluation process will generate fuller representations of quality while also treating the evaluand as more than simply a technical object. In this article, the authors summarize the probative evaluation approach, discuss aspects of moral reasoning that may limit this standards-based model, and propose an alternative dialectical persuasion. The field of evaluation, particularly program evaluation, is fertile territory for the investigation of values within social inquiry. Program evaluation specialists have an explicit responsibility of discerning the value (merit, worth, or significance) of a program. Because the very nature of their work centers around the formation of evaluative claims about human processes and products, the theories and practices of these social scientists lend them-selves to critical study In this article, we focus our attention on one particular individual and his persistent drive for objective, analytical tactics in the conduct of evaluations-Michael Scriven. Evaluation theorist, practitioner, and philosopher, Scriven has encouraged those pursuing evaluative inquiry to adopt explicit, rule-governed procedures for determining the value of