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ii Highway construction projects serve as a good example where society can benefit from fast completion. A+B auctions, a type of innovative scoring auctions, address this concern by incentivizing timely completion through scores that combine price and time incentives. In the first part of the dissertation, I investigate in A+B auctions by building a theory of A+B bidding that incorporates incentives and production uncertainty, as well as structurally estimating bidding behaviors and auction performance using data from the California Department of Transportation (Caltran). I find that, in equilibrium, bidders skew the days bid below the true planned construction target days to raise the price bids. Moreover, self-selected construction time that is different from the expected social-optimal time causes ex post efficiency loss and the auction mechanism can fail at picking the socially-efficient bidders ex ante. Counterfactual analysis suggests that procuring schemes with lower incentives or even conversion back to traditional contracts are likely to yield better social outcomes