Is there an Empirical Disagreement between Genic and Genotypic Selection Models?

From its inception, genic selectionism – the thesis, roughly, that evolutionary processes are best understood from the gene’s-eye point of view – has had its detractors. Some early opponents of genic selectionism (e.g, Sober and Lewontin, 1982) claimed that for cases such as heterozygote superiority, the genotypic model – but not the genic model – provides a correct causal account; the genic model is logically derived from the genotypic model with the result that crucial information is missing from the genic account. While some defenders of genic selectionism (e.g, Sterelny and Kitcher, 1988) have claimed that the genic model can provide a correct causal account, all involved in the debate have assumed that the genic and genotypic models agree in their predictions. Diverging from this consensus, Brandon and Nijhout (2006) attempt to refute genic selectionism by describing a case in which the genic and genotypic models yield incompatible predictions; these authors contend that the predictions of the genic model are incorrect. The present article argues that Brandon and Nijhout fail to demonstrate that the models make incompatible predictions and endorses the traditional critique of genic selectionism that does not contest its empirical adequacy