Comparison of dependence and punitive forms of power. Social Forces

This research examines the impact of the power relationship on tactical action (i.e., damage and concession tactics) in conflict. It tests a theory of bilateral deter-rence and determines whether theoretical principles designed for punitive power extend to power dependence. The theoretical principles are that unequal power will produce more use of power (i.e., damage tactics) than equal power, and also that the total amount of power across actors in a relationship will be negatively related to power use. These hypotheses are tested in a laboratory setting that separates de-pendence from punitive power, enables actors to make offers and counteroffers across a series of rounds (i.e., engage in explicit negotiation), and contains the option to engage in damaging and threatening action. The results support the theory of bilateral deterrence with regard to punitive power, offer partial support to extension of the theory to power dependence, and demonstrate that the distinc-tion between punitive and dependence forms of power is important. This paper deals with the impact of power on tactical action in conflict. The theory and research is organized around two conceptual distinctions: one between power based on dependence versus punitive capability, and the other between relative power (i.e., power difference) and "total power" in a relationship (i.e., across actors). The paper will argue that these dis-tinctions are important on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Theo-retically, they are important to explicate the connection between concep-tions of power that stress the coercive foundation of power (Bierstedt 1950; Tedeschi, Schlenker & Bonoma 1973) and those that treat power as depen