[243] A Theory of Bounded Deterrence

According to this analysis, the deterrent relationship is bounded by two concepts, the nuclear threshold and the level of unacceptable damage, each of which is a function of the utility of the threatened objective to both deterrer and aggressor. The crucial assumption of the theory, that the utility of foreign policy objectives varies with the objective, is tested empirically regarding American attitudes toward security commitments. Five variables loading on three dimensions predict the utility of these commitments. A consequence of the theory is that it calls into doubt government assertions that the nuclear umbrella provides as much security to allies as to the deterrer. The Utility of Strategic Objectives With the innovation of increasingly destructive nuclear and transport technology, the possibility grows that military means will deny political ends a primary role in the formulation of security policy. Easily oversimplified in the face of seemingly omnipotent weapons, strategy demands perpetual reassessment. More than a decade ago, massiv