Abduction And The Limits Of Formalization

Paul Bourgine's text "Models of Abduction " is undoubtfully ingenious, bringing forth a theory of abduction whose purpose is to check its adequacy for the whole field of cognitive science. I will not face Bourgine's text directly and I have sincerely to confess that such an enterpris e would go further beyond my competence. Hence, the route I chose for this possible dialogue with Bourgine is an indirect one. I will construct another view of abduction and take it as a starting point to raise some doubts about the state of the art of abduction in cognitive science. Peirce's theory of abduction involves many aspects (see Santaella 1993). All of them may be summarized in one central issue: its initiative, originary, spontaneous, and free character. The selection of quotations below will be able to highlight this character. All the ideas of science come to it by way of abduction. Abduction consists in studying facts and devising a theory to explain them (5.145). Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis. It is the only logical operation which introduces any new idea (5.171). Abduction is originary in respect to being the only kind of argument which starts a new idea (2.96)....Every single item of scientific theory which stands stablished today has been due to Abduction (5.127). Abduction, although it is very little hampered by logical rules, nevertheless is logical inference, asserting it