This paper analyzes the worst-case efficiency ratio of false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. False-name-proofness generalizes strategy-proofness by assuming that a bidder can submit multiple bids under fictitious identifiers. Even the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism is not false-name-proof. It has previously been shown that there is no false-name-proof mechanism that always achieves a Pareto efficient allocation. Consequently, if false-name bids are possible, we need to sacrifice efficiency to some extent. This leaves the natural question of how much surplus must be sacrificed. To answer this question, this paper focuses on worst-case analysis. Specifically, we consider the fraction of the Pareto efficient surplus th...
We identify a distinctive class of combinatorial auction pro-tocols called a Price-oriented, Rationi...
Greedy algorithms are known to provide near optimal approximation guarantees for Combinatorial Aucti...
www.kecl.ntt.co.jp/csl/ccrg/members/yokoo/ This paper presents the new false-name-proof multi-unit a...
This paper analyzes the worst-case efficiency ratio of false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechan...
Combinatorial auctions are multiple-item auctions in which bidders may place bids on any package (su...
In Internet auctions, it is easy for a bidder to submit multiple bids under multiple identifiers (e....
In Internet auctions, it is easy for a bidder to submit multiple bids under multiple identifiers (e....
AbstractThis paper presents a new combinatorial auction protocol that is robust against false-name b...
Session A2 - Algorithmic Game Theory IAlthough the celebrated Vickrey auction is strategy-proof and ...
AbstractThis paper presents a new combinatorial auction protocol that is robust against false-name b...
This paper presents a new combinatorial auction protocol (LDS protocol) that is robust against false...
False-name manipulations • In highly anonymous environments such as the Internet, an agent can prete...
Abstract. Some important classical mechanisms considered in Microeconomics and Game Theory require t...
False-name manipulations • In highly anonymous environments such as the Internet, an agent can prete...
Some important classical mechanisms considered in Microeconomics and Game Theory require the solutio...
We identify a distinctive class of combinatorial auction pro-tocols called a Price-oriented, Rationi...
Greedy algorithms are known to provide near optimal approximation guarantees for Combinatorial Aucti...
www.kecl.ntt.co.jp/csl/ccrg/members/yokoo/ This paper presents the new false-name-proof multi-unit a...
This paper analyzes the worst-case efficiency ratio of false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechan...
Combinatorial auctions are multiple-item auctions in which bidders may place bids on any package (su...
In Internet auctions, it is easy for a bidder to submit multiple bids under multiple identifiers (e....
In Internet auctions, it is easy for a bidder to submit multiple bids under multiple identifiers (e....
AbstractThis paper presents a new combinatorial auction protocol that is robust against false-name b...
Session A2 - Algorithmic Game Theory IAlthough the celebrated Vickrey auction is strategy-proof and ...
AbstractThis paper presents a new combinatorial auction protocol that is robust against false-name b...
This paper presents a new combinatorial auction protocol (LDS protocol) that is robust against false...
False-name manipulations • In highly anonymous environments such as the Internet, an agent can prete...
Abstract. Some important classical mechanisms considered in Microeconomics and Game Theory require t...
False-name manipulations • In highly anonymous environments such as the Internet, an agent can prete...
Some important classical mechanisms considered in Microeconomics and Game Theory require the solutio...
We identify a distinctive class of combinatorial auction pro-tocols called a Price-oriented, Rationi...
Greedy algorithms are known to provide near optimal approximation guarantees for Combinatorial Aucti...
www.kecl.ntt.co.jp/csl/ccrg/members/yokoo/ This paper presents the new false-name-proof multi-unit a...