Free riding in team production arises because individual effort is not perfectly observable. It seems natural to suppose that greater transparency would enhance incentives. Therefore, it is puzzling that team production often lacks transparency about individual contributions despite negligible costs for providing such information. We offer a rationale for this by demonstrating that transparency can actually hurt incentives. In the presence of career concerns information on the quality of task execution improves incentives while sustaining a cooperative team spirit. In contrast, making the identity of individual contributors observable induces sabotage behavior that looks like jealousy but arises purely from signal jamming by less successful...
We analyze the impact of individuals ' self-attribution biases on the formation of teams in the...
The question how transparency in organizations affects performance has received considerable interes...
We analyze the impact of individuals' self-attribution biases on the formation of teams in the workp...
Free riding in team production arises because individual effort is not perfectly observable. It seem...
In a team project with significant complementarities between various players' individual tasks, news...
This article studies the effect of transparency among peers on the principal's cost of providing inc...
In a two-period continuous effort investment game as in Mohnen, et al. (2008), we demonstrate that p...
Holmström (1982) established that free riding behaviors are pervasive whenever people are paid accor...
Should workers be informed of the incentive schemes governing their team co-workers? Should workers ...
We use experiments to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team production.Under ...
It is often suggested that team spirit counteracts free-riding. Testing for team spirit with field d...
An agent, who cares about signaling his ability, chooses among di¤erent projects that generate obser...
This paper examines joint decision–making in a team where members have a common goal and exert indiv...
This study investigates whether the benefit firms can extract from team member communication to the ...
We use an experiment to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team production. Und...
We analyze the impact of individuals ' self-attribution biases on the formation of teams in the...
The question how transparency in organizations affects performance has received considerable interes...
We analyze the impact of individuals' self-attribution biases on the formation of teams in the workp...
Free riding in team production arises because individual effort is not perfectly observable. It seem...
In a team project with significant complementarities between various players' individual tasks, news...
This article studies the effect of transparency among peers on the principal's cost of providing inc...
In a two-period continuous effort investment game as in Mohnen, et al. (2008), we demonstrate that p...
Holmström (1982) established that free riding behaviors are pervasive whenever people are paid accor...
Should workers be informed of the incentive schemes governing their team co-workers? Should workers ...
We use experiments to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team production.Under ...
It is often suggested that team spirit counteracts free-riding. Testing for team spirit with field d...
An agent, who cares about signaling his ability, chooses among di¤erent projects that generate obser...
This paper examines joint decision–making in a team where members have a common goal and exert indiv...
This study investigates whether the benefit firms can extract from team member communication to the ...
We use an experiment to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team production. Und...
We analyze the impact of individuals ' self-attribution biases on the formation of teams in the...
The question how transparency in organizations affects performance has received considerable interes...
We analyze the impact of individuals' self-attribution biases on the formation of teams in the workp...