In this paper I argue that there is a difficulty for Fine's exact semantics for counterfactuals. The difficulty undermines Fine's reasons for preferring exact semantics to possible worlds semantics
Many defend the thesis that when someone knows p, they couldn’t easily have been wrong about p. But ...
Philosophers typically rely on intuitions when providing a semantics for counterfactual conditionals...
It is commonly believed that the role of context cannot be ignored in the analysis of conditionals, ...
In this paper I argue that there is a difficulty for Fine's exact semantics for counterfactuals. The...
The standard semantics for counterfactuals ensures that any counterfactual with a true antecedent an...
The standard view about counterfactuals is that a counterfactual (A \u3e C) is true if and only if t...
Counterpossibles are counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents. The problem of counterpossi...
Counterfactuals such as If the world did not exist, we would not notice it have been a challenge for...
The object of this paper is to examine two approaches to giving non-vacuous truth conditions for cou...
Closest-possible-world analyses of counterfactuals suffer from what has been called the ‘problem of ...
In this paper I investigate the issue of the context-dependence of counterfactual conditionals and h...
The traditional Lewis–Stalnaker semantics treats all counterfactuals with an impossible antecedent a...
Ordinarily counterfactuals are seen as making statements about states of affairs, a...
Making sense of our reasoning in disputes about necessary truths requires admitting nonvacuous count...
This paper defends the thesis that counterfactuals are strict conditionals. Its purpose is...
Many defend the thesis that when someone knows p, they couldn’t easily have been wrong about p. But ...
Philosophers typically rely on intuitions when providing a semantics for counterfactual conditionals...
It is commonly believed that the role of context cannot be ignored in the analysis of conditionals, ...
In this paper I argue that there is a difficulty for Fine's exact semantics for counterfactuals. The...
The standard semantics for counterfactuals ensures that any counterfactual with a true antecedent an...
The standard view about counterfactuals is that a counterfactual (A \u3e C) is true if and only if t...
Counterpossibles are counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents. The problem of counterpossi...
Counterfactuals such as If the world did not exist, we would not notice it have been a challenge for...
The object of this paper is to examine two approaches to giving non-vacuous truth conditions for cou...
Closest-possible-world analyses of counterfactuals suffer from what has been called the ‘problem of ...
In this paper I investigate the issue of the context-dependence of counterfactual conditionals and h...
The traditional Lewis–Stalnaker semantics treats all counterfactuals with an impossible antecedent a...
Ordinarily counterfactuals are seen as making statements about states of affairs, a...
Making sense of our reasoning in disputes about necessary truths requires admitting nonvacuous count...
This paper defends the thesis that counterfactuals are strict conditionals. Its purpose is...
Many defend the thesis that when someone knows p, they couldn’t easily have been wrong about p. But ...
Philosophers typically rely on intuitions when providing a semantics for counterfactual conditionals...
It is commonly believed that the role of context cannot be ignored in the analysis of conditionals, ...
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