There are powerful reasons to think of perceptual content as determined at least in part by the environment of the perceiving subject. Externalist views such as this are often rejected on grounds that they do not give a good account of hallucinations. The chapter shows that this reason for rejecting content externalism is not well founded if we embrace a moderate externalism about content, that is, an externalist view on which content is only in part dependent on the experiencing subject“s environment. The chapter starts by motivating content externalism. It then argues that hallucinations are best understood in terms of a deficiency of veridical perceptual experiences. The chapter discusses the consequences of this thesis by developing a v...
Since Kripke, Putnam and Burge raised the subject in the 1970s, there has been a vigorous debate ab...
In this paper, we present a view of conscious perception that supposes a processual unity between th...
Hilary Putnam has famously argued that “we are brains in a vat” is necessarily false. The argument a...
There are powerful reasons to think of perceptual content as determined at least in part by the envi...
A recurrent pattern of debate between the proponents of internalism and externalism over mental phen...
Externalism about content is the view that the social and / or the physical environment contributes ...
In this article I argue for a novel theory of representational content, which I call ‘subjective ext...
Externalism about content is the view that the social and / or the physical environment contributes ...
Externalist representationalists claim that the phenomenal character of a visual perceptual experien...
The classic thought experiments for Content Externalism have been motivated by consideration of inte...
The idea that our sensory experience cannot serve as a ground for knowledge lingers on within philos...
The strongest argument for social externalism derives from the rule-following considerations that mo...
I argue that phenomenal externalism is preferable to phenomenal internalism on the basis of external...
It is argued that standard arguments for the Externalism of mental states do not succeed in the case...
Representational externalism is the view that what an individual’s mental state represents is determ...
Since Kripke, Putnam and Burge raised the subject in the 1970s, there has been a vigorous debate ab...
In this paper, we present a view of conscious perception that supposes a processual unity between th...
Hilary Putnam has famously argued that “we are brains in a vat” is necessarily false. The argument a...
There are powerful reasons to think of perceptual content as determined at least in part by the envi...
A recurrent pattern of debate between the proponents of internalism and externalism over mental phen...
Externalism about content is the view that the social and / or the physical environment contributes ...
In this article I argue for a novel theory of representational content, which I call ‘subjective ext...
Externalism about content is the view that the social and / or the physical environment contributes ...
Externalist representationalists claim that the phenomenal character of a visual perceptual experien...
The classic thought experiments for Content Externalism have been motivated by consideration of inte...
The idea that our sensory experience cannot serve as a ground for knowledge lingers on within philos...
The strongest argument for social externalism derives from the rule-following considerations that mo...
I argue that phenomenal externalism is preferable to phenomenal internalism on the basis of external...
It is argued that standard arguments for the Externalism of mental states do not succeed in the case...
Representational externalism is the view that what an individual’s mental state represents is determ...
Since Kripke, Putnam and Burge raised the subject in the 1970s, there has been a vigorous debate ab...
In this paper, we present a view of conscious perception that supposes a processual unity between th...
Hilary Putnam has famously argued that “we are brains in a vat” is necessarily false. The argument a...