Managerial Performance and Information Disclosure – A Case Study of Taiwan Electronics Industry

[[abstract]]國內外接連爆發重大財務弊案，究其原因是公司管理階層的監理不當及透明度不足，因此造成與外部投資人間產生資訊不對稱。加強資訊揭露將有助於降低資訊不對稱及提升證券市場之健全。此外，高階經理人擁有管理企業的專業與資源，本研究由代理關係的角度，探討高階經理人薪酬與管理績效對資訊揭露程度之影響。 以2006年至2010年間，台灣電子業公司之高階經理人薪酬、資產報酬率及股票報酬率進行實證分析。本研究係採用OLS迴歸模型，在控制負債比率、公司規模等控制變數後，實證結果發現，高階經理人薪酬、資產報酬率及股票報酬率對資訊揭露程度皆呈正向關聯性，代表當高階經理人薪酬與公司績效增加時，企業的資訊揭露程度會提升。本文將可提供公司的董事會，透過對經理人加薪提高資訊揭露程度，以及對於營運績效不佳之企業提高自願性揭露程度。[[abstract]]Information Asymmetry resulted from firm management’s ill governance has been the case of many major financial scandals that took place at home and abroad However information disclosure will help to reduce the level of Information Asymmetry and strengthening enhances the integrity of Securities market Since senior managers held profession resources for disclosure This study investigates and discusses the influence of Executive Compensation and management performance toward the level of Information Disclosure from Agency Relationship’s point of view This study results show the Positive Analysis of Executive Compensation Return on Assets (ROA) and stock price of Taiwan’s Electronics Industry from 2006 to 2010 This study adopts Ordinary Least Square regression model The control variables are Leverage and company size The empirical result shows that Executive Compensation Return on Assets (ROA) and Stock Price all indicate positive correlation to the level of Information Disclosure It means that when Executive Compensation and corporate performance increase the level of Information Disclosure will also increase This study shows rising payment for manager will increase the the level of Information Disclosure and hence it can be a reference for Board of Directors It is also a good reference for government to encourage poor-performed firms to improve the level of executive compensation for Better Information Disclosur